• General

  • Request for Comment - Implement Leadership Council

Hey all, happy to see the proposal and discussions on it.

Agree, 2 separate proposals may be prudent. I will echo Tex's points that such a DAO leadership team is very much needed, and this is a step in the right direction. I am really thankful that the Strategos and Core team elected me for the position, but also would support another proposal for electing council members if that is what the ohmies want. With that said, having worked closely with all of the other elected members, I am more than confident in their judgement, character, and their dedication to the success of this project. I would be happy to vouch for all of them in a re-election, even with myself excluded. I would also say there are plenty of other great individuals in the DAO who could serve this role. We really are spoiled with the awesome people we have in this organization.

Addressing some concerns brought up, particularly from @m_j_r.

what do we do in a situation where the community has lost confidence or some bad actor has inflicted damage?

This is one of our primary goals for the future of Olympus. To decentralize the protocol and have a system minimally governed, and for situations where governance is needed, is purely the will of the community. In fact, bringing about this change in structure is the primary job of this proposed leadership structure. The members serve temporary positions, which should be re-elected (however often the community feels comfortable). I think this should be sufficient for this proposal, as I don't think the minute details of this kind of re-election need to be hashed out right now. This will be the job for the community and the DAO moving forward. I think at this point, there is dysfunction that needs to be addressed before we can tackle details like this. There has to be a trade-off where we trust the elected members to execute and bring about this kind of change, held accountable by the community.

Does the DAO provide a platform where the community can voice their concerns and vote transparently in a way that is append-only?

This will hopefully be alleviated a bit with on-chain governance. This is a huge focus for this year, and we in the DAO are exploring ways to reduce the risks of this kind of misuse of power. Having this large of a treasury is a huge honeypot for malicious actors. Zeus has some cool proposals coming up to address some of these concerns. Bringing about this system is one of my main goals.

I believe we should pursue the creation of an analogue to the Curve "Emergency DAO" as another form of capture resistance.

100% agreed. I love the nope DAOs forming around defi and I foresee us going this route as well. But I think this is past the scope of this proposal.

While I love this idea, and agree in a streamlined leadership structure to fix up dao-related issues of timezones etc.
I would expect and hope that a council should include or have a top down support of the importance of 'Product Design' of Olympus products and the expected finish of design quality in a site with financial instruments and investment.

So, my thinking is, what makes up a successful company? From the Council list, who is best and qualified to look after the strategic decisions on User Experience: Customer Experience, Service Design, UX Copywriting and User Interface, if design cannot be at the upmost seat or represented, I would like to see a Council roadmap on the principles that holds 'product design' and quality of design in high regard and the principles and process be honoured by all.
- Ethics
- Process
- Quality

I am particularly not that fond of the current allocation structure weighting of design-driven value; I have polled on twitter seeing 64% of people see 'UXUI Design' as the single most important factor in investing on a DeFi site after they have done their research, this polled over all other areas of smart contract security etc. This allocation structure based on algo/VR/big data-driven tech companies in Silicon valley; design is not so forefront right now in those organisations as they grab into these emerging markets, yet I believe DeFi is and heavily reliant on experienced quality UXUI designers with industry knowledge, not easy to find.

There are cultures in organisation structures that are weighted more to Product or Development; yet we should also shift this towards design over time.

Why was Apple successful?
They are a CX based company who innovates for users using design driven features and design-thinking processes.
I would hope that in this council we can improve the standing of design within the Dao.

    Thanks @tex for coming up with this proposal. Imo it makes a lot of sense to move in this direction.

    As a DAO we want to move to a democratic system structure and the idea of a leadership council will help us reinforce hierarchy within the DAO.

    Following these lines (and as other people commented in previous posts) I believe that this OIP should solely focus on the ideation of a 6 people council + Zeus as a permanent 7th member.

    On top of that, aiming for full fairness and in pursuit of the best democratic standards, I would opt for an independent council member nomination + snapshot vote. Ideally, all ohmies could present themselves as council candidates, and the community will be smart enough to recognize leaders such as the ones that @tex proposed in this OIP.

    So I would amend this OIP so that it lays out the following roadmap:

    1. Vote on the idea of a 6 member council + Zeus.
    2. Define the role that each council member would pursue (this would ensure a diverse council).
    3. If the OIP passes, people can start presenting themselves as candidates for 1 of the 6 council spots. Candidates should apply for 1 specific spot + list the reasons why ohmies should vote for them.
    4. Create 6 different snapshots (one for each council member role), where all the candidates who applied for that role (and properly filled the requirements) are listed.
    5. Vote
    6. Council election.

    Very well written and explained @tex.

    I think that a council model (which is really about delegation) is a big step forward. Direct governance through unfiltered on chain votes brings a lot of problems in terms of voter engagement, execution speed and unclear governance model.

    I'm also strongly in favor of implementing it in a two step process (vote 1 framework, vote 2 members). The initial choice of candidates might affect the outcome of implementing the council model and vice versa. A rolling council tenure where 1/3 is replaced at a time was a good suggestion.

    However, from what I read in the description is that the council is another operational group in the DAO that takes on a set of operational tasks that in traditional organisations are handled by the CEO.

    I have two reservations:
    1. I fear this is another reorg that is done without having a clear overall picture of the entire organisation. How does the council structure relate to current organisational structures in the DAO? What role will strategos have, the DAO core group, working groups etc?

    2. In the "Motivation" and "Proposal" section the council is described as taking a high level responsibility - "new leadership team is both accountable and has the authority to make strategic decisions on behalf of the DAO…". However, what is listed in the "Deliverables" section are operational tasks.

    If the council effectively replace the CEO (by the description of the deliverables), token holders represent both shareholders and the board. I think that the most important task of the highest executive role in an org is missing from the Deliverables and the role assignment. That is strategy.

    Imho the number one task of the council should be to produce and present a coherent strategy for the DAO (that is approved by the community), then the rest will follow. A strategy is not a vision, mission and OKR's. Good strategies identify the core challenge the organization is facing and is actionable with insights on the strategic and tactical levels.

    I see two issues here:

    First off, someone's background should be in consideration for these types of roles. I would like to see tradfi backgrounds represented in policy and treasury decisions.

    Second, someone from marketing should sit on this council so that ideas can be smoothed from a PR standpoint.

    Other than those two callouts, I have voted FOR the measure and welcome the council!

      HAPPY OHMIVERSARY

      Quick note: Have been pretty vocal during the internal crafting of this RFC amongst Strategos + Core.

      My position: Community Stratego

      First of all, I'd like to preface things by saying that I'm happy we've managed to push out the first actionable step towards steering Olympus back on track. I've only been in the Stratego role for a little under a month now and one of the main reasons why I was moved into this role is that I took my frustrations, being;

      . the constant flux-state that the DAO had appeared to be in.

      . the lack of high-lvl vision, cohesive branding, and narrative maintenance

      . obvious accountability/responsibility disconnect at the top of the food chain (core<>stratego misalignment)

      and started asking questions, plugging holes, and proposing solutions for problems that appeared to be circular.

      One thing I realized after being thrust into the role, is how -EV things really were at a high-lvl. Core had unintentionally consolidated a lot of the protocols power and the day-2-day executors - Strategos - who essentially run all departments, had very little power

      . Core has pOHM, Strategos don't have vested packages.

      . Core controlled most MS infra, Strategos didn't.

      What's worse, this power actually translates into accountability & responsibilities, or the lack thereof. This has been a key misalignment at a high-lvl and the flow-on effect throughout the entire DAO has attributed to a lot of the execution issues that the Community end up sensing -> which translates into uncertainty -> people lose conviction in the vision -> ensue the last 2-3 months.

      For a protocol that minimizes arbitrary decisions at a mechanism level, it was quite ironic to see these human coordination failures firsthand, yet sad to see my inkling reveal a truth that no one quite knew how to deal with.

      This might appear to be highly critical but I think it's also worth noting how much transformation Olympus has undergone (positive transformation). Accolades and achievements are as follows - Olympus has only been around for a year (:

      • 0 -> 3.3b -> ~ 400m Treasury
      • ~ 80,000 Holders
      • Forked 100 + times
      • 50-75 part-time/full-time contributors
      • Sprawling Econohmy (moat)

      Let me now outline some things I both like/dislike about this RFC:

      LIKES:

      • Clear and concise OKRs that are realistic and can be used to craft effective budgets for departments & WGs.
      • Assistance in the case of any legal issues that may arise.
      • Council roles have highly specific responsibilities

      DISLIKES:

      • Some council member responsibilites are too broad and this will likely lead to execution failures

      • Echoing FoxMaison thoughts, i don't feel like we have anyone on this council who will;

        • Maintain brand across Olympus products

        • Enhance public image and reputation

        • Lead DAO values and culture

      • Lack of clarity around Zeus' responsibilites on the council.

      • Amongst the roles & responsibilites, i don't see anything honing in on and prioritising transparency.

      I'll leave things there - overall, I'm leaning towards two separate proposals as some people have been suggesting. On the other hand, the proposed members are highly capable and likely the best people for these roles (bar a few responsibilities). Need to see more discussion before voting on this RFC

          Considering learnings from other DAOs like Wonderlands Sifu Gate or the recent liquidation of the Treasury of Invictus DAO I would strongly suggest that this counsel should be doxed.

          The proposal points out how important "trust" would be and DAO history has proven trust to be very difficult with anonymous entities.

          #voting for a doxed counsel

          Edit: and trust could be further improved by a clever system of economic incentives. That personal funds of counsel members are at stake and you cannot get away with malicious behavior.

            seijaku My only worry with a separate proposal for voting is it'll turn into a popularity contest of sorts. We're not pitching to VCs here. I'm open to it but my worry is it'll turn into a shitstorm.

                ChrisS Completely disagree with this sentiment. I can understand the concern surrounding anonymity in this scenario but tooling capabilities are increasing 10 fold, we don't need to implement such perverse requests when infra can solve the concern you have.

                  nach211 Completely agree.

                  tex Coordinating Marketing / Communication across DAO groups

                  No offense to Apollo, i don't think this should be in the scope of his role.

                      tex definitely a step in the right direction, and thank you for pushing it through. Given the reputation of proposed council members I have no problem voting yes but I do agree that smart major points have been raised in discussion above that can prove benefitial:

                      - on-chain governance should be top priority and we should attach deadline to it (March 2023 will be way too late)
                      - split the proposal into two votes = Council framework & Council Members
                      - vote per Council Member
                      - role definitions & candidates difersity
                      - stratregy & brand/marketing responsible members
                      - introduce 1/3 rolling for council members
                      - emergency dao

                      We take great pride of our community, and it might be a positive message to elect additional two community members (1 old ohmie + 1 new ohmie) to voice community concerns to the Council. Two just to keep odd number of council members if there would be a brand/marketing Council member as suggested above this would be 1 community member.

                        @Dropkickdarren agree with you - infrastructure and correct incentives should be the preferred solution. Also doxed people can mess up.

                        Still could you please point out again what guarantees the "trust" here? What is the incentive structure in place that ensures aliment with the project? What is at stake for the individuals in the counsel?

                        Perceived track record is nice - but didn't really help over at wonderland.

                          At the risk of sounding like a lawyer… I think we need to add the following to the leadership proposal:

                          is each member the executive for their responsibility area? what is the extent of the power? can they hire/fire Strategos, Program leads, contributors? can they spend funds within their area of responsibility?

                          what is the responsibility of the committee as a body? what is the extent of its powers? can they hire/fire Strategos, Program leads, contributors? can they spend DAO funds? how much can they spend?

                          how regular are meetings? how much notice is required? how are votes decided, a simple majority? is there a quorum for meetings? how are decisions of the committee recorded and disseminated?

                          how are disputes within areas of responsibility resolved?

                          what public reporting to the community is required?

                          how can members be removed/replaced?

                          Sources of power are probably the most important issue - community is ultimate power - community appoints council - council is responsible for DAO - council is source of power for council members responsibility areas - council members as responsible person for their area appoint program leads/strategos who are accountable for compping contributors.

                          I like the idea of each member being a CEO of their area of responsibility and disputes resolved by vote of council.

                          Also what happens to core team?

                          Don't worry - I am drafting answers to these atm and hopefully will be able to share something in a day or two

                            Mark11

                            There is an issue with this poll set to finish tomorrow, and then go to Snapshot according to the current OIP text. @tex I think this is healthy discussion and this discussion should be allowed more time - and changes to the proposal to be presented and discussed.

                                There needs to be a DAO wide elected members who should have a position in the council. It could be community mods or someone who is in touch with the community.

                                Having been involved with the DAO at a strategic and operational level over the last 6+ months, I strongly welcome this push to develop an overall Council for the DAO. One of the most difficult issues we have dealt with as a DAO is a lack of operational and strategic clarity. The development of the Olympus12 Action Plan, which I would assume Council members would be responsible for implementing, and OKRs (aligned with the Action Plan) are good first steps.

                                The next step is operational and executional clarity and focus. One of the issues that has impacted the DAO is a lack of follow through on various ideas, specifically as it relates to major initiatives pushed over multi-month periods and then abandoned due to the emergence of another "shiny new idea." This is problematic on many levels.

                                Having a Council in place that can help to drive clarity and executional focus will be important.

                                A few things mentioned above that I agree with:

                                1. Create a separate Council approval and nomination process. I have worked with many of the people listed as Council members and can vouch for their dedication to the protocol and significant contributions. However, I also feel that each person should be asked to develop a self-nomination post along with information about their specific mandate and overall responsibilities and goals, which the community can review and comment on, as well as up-vote (support).

                                2. Provide additional Council slots for branding, marketing and communication: This has been one of Olympus' most pressing problems. There is a lack of understanding of the value of a reserve currency in DeFi, and more importantly, how the DAO's operations (especially the growing Treasury) translate into benefits for ecosystem participants.

                                3. Provide a slot for community representatives to ensure that that the concerns and needs of rank and file community members can be heard.

                                4. Provide more information about how the Council will operate: How often will the Council meet? Will meetings be open or closed? How will the Council report out to the community? How will Council members be compensated? If some of these answers can be provided in an addendum to the proposal, that would be great.

                                I second @cpt_zeke's request that:

                                1. This proposal not be moved to Snapshot until it is amended to only focus on the ratification of the Council role

                                2. Proposed Council members be asked to develop self-nomination threads for community voting (upvotes) on the forum. Other community members should be able to self-nominate themselves for the group.

                                Lots of good discussion here, going to respond to some of the top discussion points in separate comments. Just a disclaimer that the following are my personal opinions on the topic:

                                EdgeCaser re: two proposals for structure and nominations

                                I want to preface this by saying that I agree to an extent, but on a longer time horizon. I think that reforming the leadership structure is important and urgent, while democratizing nominations is important but not urgent. This proposal is not an end state, but a step in the right direction. One of the deliverables is specifically charting a course to the destination of on-chain governance. To channel Vitalik (reference post here), the ideal DAO structure imo consists of "multifactorial consensus", with this proposal being for the roadmap (ie. the set of ideas broadcasted earlier on in the project's history about the direction the project would be going).

                                Given the above, I feel strongly that it is not desirable or in the best interest of working groups to conduct Council nominations via token voting at this point in time. This will create a political spectacle that would be more of a distraction, open up nominations to issues like collusion, and create division for the DAO as nominees jockey for power. The nominations amongst Strategos and Core Team already experienced some of this in a much milder form. It is also not my understanding that token holdings are the best proxy for selecting leaders, given there is not much insight into the current operational side of Olympus leadership, an issue that I hope this Council remedies.

                                I would suggest token holders who disagree with that assessment vote "No" on the proposal. Most proposals are path-dependent and can be broken down into many sub-decisions whose impacts ripple forward in time. My hope is that this initial Council gives more transparency into roadmap decisions and primes the community for on-chain selection of members. The assessment earmarked for September should provide a model for how we conduct assessments and nominations to inform the future state of elections via on-chain governance.

                                    EdgeCaser

                                    They are two different concepts. In best interests of time maybe start with a "default" set and have mechanisms to vote others in. I assume decisions of impact will always be made by community comment and vote.

                                      @tex that is a fair point re: nomination processes. I had not thought we would go through such a nomination process before deciding to ratify the current proposed members - rather as a follow-up step should it happen that it doesn't go through.

                                      It is a sticky situation, no doubt. I recognize we need to move fast, and I need to balance my sense of urgency with my preference toward crispness in electoral questions from a procedural and historical POV.

                                      tex I agree on urgency, and possibility of the process becoming a problem instead of a solution. But also would love to see clear specification of how Council will operate and report as asked by others above.

                                      Once those agreed, could we phrase this proposal as Interim Council with 6+6 months mandate?
                                      - In first 6 months Council would commit to develop and implement [DAO-WIDE 4] Decentralize Operations based on agreed approach
                                      - If above implemented Interim Council mandate is extended for additional 6 months, if failed Strategos and Council members give their mandates for a vote to the wider community, by this time we should have Emergency Council ready to step in if needed.
                                      - would suggest 3-month mark where Strategos and Council members will vote for continuation or removal of individual Council members.
                                      - also it would be good to have a nominated mediator outside Strategos/Council that could handle disputes