• General
  • Request for Comment - Implement Leadership Council

Very well written and explained @tex.

I think that a council model (which is really about delegation) is a big step forward. Direct governance through unfiltered on chain votes brings a lot of problems in terms of voter engagement, execution speed and unclear governance model.

I'm also strongly in favor of implementing it in a two step process (vote 1 framework, vote 2 members). The initial choice of candidates might affect the outcome of implementing the council model and vice versa. A rolling council tenure where 1/3 is replaced at a time was a good suggestion.

However, from what I read in the description is that the council is another operational group in the DAO that takes on a set of operational tasks that in traditional organisations are handled by the CEO.

I have two reservations:
1. I fear this is another reorg that is done without having a clear overall picture of the entire organisation. How does the council structure relate to current organisational structures in the DAO? What role will strategos have, the DAO core group, working groups etc?

2. In the "Motivation" and "Proposal" section the council is described as taking a high level responsibility - "new leadership team is both accountable and has the authority to make strategic decisions on behalf of the DAO…". However, what is listed in the "Deliverables" section are operational tasks.

If the council effectively replace the CEO (by the description of the deliverables), token holders represent both shareholders and the board. I think that the most important task of the highest executive role in an org is missing from the Deliverables and the role assignment. That is strategy.

Imho the number one task of the council should be to produce and present a coherent strategy for the DAO (that is approved by the community), then the rest will follow. A strategy is not a vision, mission and OKR's. Good strategies identify the core challenge the organization is facing and is actionable with insights on the strategic and tactical levels.

I see two issues here:

First off, someone's background should be in consideration for these types of roles. I would like to see tradfi backgrounds represented in policy and treasury decisions.

Second, someone from marketing should sit on this council so that ideas can be smoothed from a PR standpoint.

Other than those two callouts, I have voted FOR the measure and welcome the council!

    HAPPY OHMIVERSARY

    Quick note: Have been pretty vocal during the internal crafting of this RFC amongst Strategos + Core.

    My position: Community Stratego

    First of all, I'd like to preface things by saying that I'm happy we've managed to push out the first actionable step towards steering Olympus back on track. I've only been in the Stratego role for a little under a month now and one of the main reasons why I was moved into this role is that I took my frustrations, being;

    . the constant flux-state that the DAO had appeared to be in.

    . the lack of high-lvl vision, cohesive branding, and narrative maintenance

    . obvious accountability/responsibility disconnect at the top of the food chain (core<>stratego misalignment)

    and started asking questions, plugging holes, and proposing solutions for problems that appeared to be circular.

    One thing I realized after being thrust into the role, is how -EV things really were at a high-lvl. Core had unintentionally consolidated a lot of the protocols power and the day-2-day executors - Strategos - who essentially run all departments, had very little power

    . Core has pOHM, Strategos don't have vested packages.

    . Core controlled most MS infra, Strategos didn't.

    What's worse, this power actually translates into accountability & responsibilities, or the lack thereof. This has been a key misalignment at a high-lvl and the flow-on effect throughout the entire DAO has attributed to a lot of the execution issues that the Community end up sensing -> which translates into uncertainty -> people lose conviction in the vision -> ensue the last 2-3 months.

    For a protocol that minimizes arbitrary decisions at a mechanism level, it was quite ironic to see these human coordination failures firsthand, yet sad to see my inkling reveal a truth that no one quite knew how to deal with.

    This might appear to be highly critical but I think it's also worth noting how much transformation Olympus has undergone (positive transformation). Accolades and achievements are as follows - Olympus has only been around for a year (:

    • 0 -> 3.3b -> ~ 400m Treasury
    • ~ 80,000 Holders
    • Forked 100 + times
    • 50-75 part-time/full-time contributors
    • Sprawling Econohmy (moat)

    Let me now outline some things I both like/dislike about this RFC:

    LIKES:

    • Clear and concise OKRs that are realistic and can be used to craft effective budgets for departments & WGs.
    • Assistance in the case of any legal issues that may arise.
    • Council roles have highly specific responsibilities

    DISLIKES:

    • Some council member responsibilites are too broad and this will likely lead to execution failures

    • Echoing FoxMaison thoughts, i don't feel like we have anyone on this council who will;

      • Maintain brand across Olympus products

      • Enhance public image and reputation

      • Lead DAO values and culture

    • Lack of clarity around Zeus' responsibilites on the council.

    • Amongst the roles & responsibilites, i don't see anything honing in on and prioritising transparency.

    I'll leave things there - overall, I'm leaning towards two separate proposals as some people have been suggesting. On the other hand, the proposed members are highly capable and likely the best people for these roles (bar a few responsibilities). Need to see more discussion before voting on this RFC

      Considering learnings from other DAOs like Wonderlands Sifu Gate or the recent liquidation of the Treasury of Invictus DAO I would strongly suggest that this counsel should be doxed.

      The proposal points out how important "trust" would be and DAO history has proven trust to be very difficult with anonymous entities.

      #voting for a doxed counsel

      Edit: and trust could be further improved by a clever system of economic incentives. That personal funds of counsel members are at stake and you cannot get away with malicious behavior.

        seijaku My only worry with a separate proposal for voting is it'll turn into a popularity contest of sorts. We're not pitching to VCs here. I'm open to it but my worry is it'll turn into a shitstorm.

          ChrisS Completely disagree with this sentiment. I can understand the concern surrounding anonymity in this scenario but tooling capabilities are increasing 10 fold, we don't need to implement such perverse requests when infra can solve the concern you have.

          nach211 Completely agree.

          tex Coordinating Marketing / Communication across DAO groups

          No offense to Apollo, i don't think this should be in the scope of his role.

          tex definitely a step in the right direction, and thank you for pushing it through. Given the reputation of proposed council members I have no problem voting yes but I do agree that smart major points have been raised in discussion above that can prove benefitial:

          - on-chain governance should be top priority and we should attach deadline to it (March 2023 will be way too late)
          - split the proposal into two votes = Council framework & Council Members
          - vote per Council Member
          - role definitions & candidates difersity
          - stratregy & brand/marketing responsible members
          - introduce 1/3 rolling for council members
          - emergency dao

          We take great pride of our community, and it might be a positive message to elect additional two community members (1 old ohmie + 1 new ohmie) to voice community concerns to the Council. Two just to keep odd number of council members if there would be a brand/marketing Council member as suggested above this would be 1 community member.

          @Dropkickdarren agree with you - infrastructure and correct incentives should be the preferred solution. Also doxed people can mess up.

          Still could you please point out again what guarantees the "trust" here? What is the incentive structure in place that ensures aliment with the project? What is at stake for the individuals in the counsel?

          Perceived track record is nice - but didn't really help over at wonderland.

            At the risk of sounding like a lawyer… I think we need to add the following to the leadership proposal:

            is each member the executive for their responsibility area? what is the extent of the power? can they hire/fire Strategos, Program leads, contributors? can they spend funds within their area of responsibility?

            what is the responsibility of the committee as a body? what is the extent of its powers? can they hire/fire Strategos, Program leads, contributors? can they spend DAO funds? how much can they spend?

            how regular are meetings? how much notice is required? how are votes decided, a simple majority? is there a quorum for meetings? how are decisions of the committee recorded and disseminated?

            how are disputes within areas of responsibility resolved?

            what public reporting to the community is required?

            how can members be removed/replaced?

            Sources of power are probably the most important issue - community is ultimate power - community appoints council - council is responsible for DAO - council is source of power for council members responsibility areas - council members as responsible person for their area appoint program leads/strategos who are accountable for compping contributors.

            I like the idea of each member being a CEO of their area of responsibility and disputes resolved by vote of council.

            Also what happens to core team?

            Don't worry - I am drafting answers to these atm and hopefully will be able to share something in a day or two

              Mark11

              There is an issue with this poll set to finish tomorrow, and then go to Snapshot according to the current OIP text. @tex I think this is healthy discussion and this discussion should be allowed more time - and changes to the proposal to be presented and discussed.

                There needs to be a DAO wide elected members who should have a position in the council. It could be community mods or someone who is in touch with the community.

                Having been involved with the DAO at a strategic and operational level over the last 6+ months, I strongly welcome this push to develop an overall Council for the DAO. One of the most difficult issues we have dealt with as a DAO is a lack of operational and strategic clarity. The development of the Olympus12 Action Plan, which I would assume Council members would be responsible for implementing, and OKRs (aligned with the Action Plan) are good first steps.

                The next step is operational and executional clarity and focus. One of the issues that has impacted the DAO is a lack of follow through on various ideas, specifically as it relates to major initiatives pushed over multi-month periods and then abandoned due to the emergence of another "shiny new idea." This is problematic on many levels.

                Having a Council in place that can help to drive clarity and executional focus will be important.

                A few things mentioned above that I agree with:

                1. Create a separate Council approval and nomination process. I have worked with many of the people listed as Council members and can vouch for their dedication to the protocol and significant contributions. However, I also feel that each person should be asked to develop a self-nomination post along with information about their specific mandate and overall responsibilities and goals, which the community can review and comment on, as well as up-vote (support).

                2. Provide additional Council slots for branding, marketing and communication: This has been one of Olympus' most pressing problems. There is a lack of understanding of the value of a reserve currency in DeFi, and more importantly, how the DAO's operations (especially the growing Treasury) translate into benefits for ecosystem participants.

                3. Provide a slot for community representatives to ensure that that the concerns and needs of rank and file community members can be heard.

                4. Provide more information about how the Council will operate: How often will the Council meet? Will meetings be open or closed? How will the Council report out to the community? How will Council members be compensated? If some of these answers can be provided in an addendum to the proposal, that would be great.

                I second @cpt_zeke's request that:

                1. This proposal not be moved to Snapshot until it is amended to only focus on the ratification of the Council role

                2. Proposed Council members be asked to develop self-nomination threads for community voting (upvotes) on the forum. Other community members should be able to self-nominate themselves for the group.

                Lots of good discussion here, going to respond to some of the top discussion points in separate comments. Just a disclaimer that the following are my personal opinions on the topic:

                EdgeCaser re: two proposals for structure and nominations

                I want to preface this by saying that I agree to an extent, but on a longer time horizon. I think that reforming the leadership structure is important and urgent, while democratizing nominations is important but not urgent. This proposal is not an end state, but a step in the right direction. One of the deliverables is specifically charting a course to the destination of on-chain governance. To channel Vitalik (reference post here), the ideal DAO structure imo consists of "multifactorial consensus", with this proposal being for the roadmap (ie. the set of ideas broadcasted earlier on in the project's history about the direction the project would be going).

                Given the above, I feel strongly that it is not desirable or in the best interest of working groups to conduct Council nominations via token voting at this point in time. This will create a political spectacle that would be more of a distraction, open up nominations to issues like collusion, and create division for the DAO as nominees jockey for power. The nominations amongst Strategos and Core Team already experienced some of this in a much milder form. It is also not my understanding that token holdings are the best proxy for selecting leaders, given there is not much insight into the current operational side of Olympus leadership, an issue that I hope this Council remedies.

                I would suggest token holders who disagree with that assessment vote "No" on the proposal. Most proposals are path-dependent and can be broken down into many sub-decisions whose impacts ripple forward in time. My hope is that this initial Council gives more transparency into roadmap decisions and primes the community for on-chain selection of members. The assessment earmarked for September should provide a model for how we conduct assessments and nominations to inform the future state of elections via on-chain governance.

                  EdgeCaser

                  They are two different concepts. In best interests of time maybe start with a "default" set and have mechanisms to vote others in. I assume decisions of impact will always be made by community comment and vote.

                  @tex that is a fair point re: nomination processes. I had not thought we would go through such a nomination process before deciding to ratify the current proposed members - rather as a follow-up step should it happen that it doesn't go through.

                  It is a sticky situation, no doubt. I recognize we need to move fast, and I need to balance my sense of urgency with my preference toward crispness in electoral questions from a procedural and historical POV.

                  tex I agree on urgency, and possibility of the process becoming a problem instead of a solution. But also would love to see clear specification of how Council will operate and report as asked by others above.

                  Once those agreed, could we phrase this proposal as Interim Council with 6+6 months mandate?
                  - In first 6 months Council would commit to develop and implement [DAO-WIDE 4] Decentralize Operations based on agreed approach
                  - If above implemented Interim Council mandate is extended for additional 6 months, if failed Strategos and Council members give their mandates for a vote to the wider community, by this time we should have Emergency Council ready to step in if needed.
                  - would suggest 3-month mark where Strategos and Council members will vote for continuation or removal of individual Council members.
                  - also it would be good to have a nominated mediator outside Strategos/Council that could handle disputes

                  cpt_zeke agreed on the healthy discussion, so I pushed the poll end date to Friday for now. The goal is to get this proposal through Snapshot by EOM, so may be best to move RFC to OIP on Saturday, proposal section live through the weekend, then run Snapshot 3/28-3/31. Thoughts?

                    I support this proposal. Three brief reasons why:

                    1. One of the Council's Core OKRs is a path to further decentralization. IMO that is a common theme in the majority of the feedback to this RFC. And it is a primary barometer with which we should hold the council accountable. We should demand & the council should provide periodic updates on the Deliverables & OKRs. I think that's a sign of a healthy DAO.
                    2. This proposal focuses on accountability. As a DAO I believe there are some process improvements that can be made, but I do not see those as complex issues (in many cases those process improvements can be made from the bottom up & do not require a council's mandate). I think the complex issues the DAO faces today are around alignment. We have to find the right balance between decentralized decision-making & innovation / execution speed. The council can help improve our execution speed while maintaining accountability to the community.
                    3. As tex said This proposal represents a stepping stone to a more decentralized way of selecting DAO leadership and a unified way of aligning direction across teams.

                    TBH I'm fired up for the next 12 months.

                    LFG!!

                    Dropkickdarren Tend to agree on this point, and @tex has obviously also commented in this vein.

                    My take on this is that there is now a dichotomy between what is right and what is expedient. Olympus is a DAO, the creation of the Council, being a big shift in structural leadership, needs a vote.. The people on this council, by the same token, should be voted on. This is not a discussion point as the democratic nature of the DAO demands it. That said, situationally I feel that we likely need to move forward based on this proposal and the suggested Council members, ideally with some additional thoughts:

                    If we can't change the Proposal, we can certainly add to it - why not add community representation beyond the Council suggested here and allow voting on that - a hybrid model of that nature might be a good compromise - an odd number obviously makes sense in ensuring the tie-break, so you'd be adding two Community representatives assuming @Zeus stays in the suggested tie-break role.

                    As discussed above in other comments, the whole proposal skews operationally. While I can entirely understand why this is given the past few months and the problems this seeks to resolve, the need to move beyond a heavily operational skew is reflected by commentary around switching and changing between projects halfway through and being led by the next shiny thing - strong strategy and clear alignment between strategy (where we are going) and Operations (How we get there) should mean less likelihood of chopping and changing. The Community seats on the Council discussed above should help with that - if there is no clear view of why the DAO is doing something and no obvious alignment between a project and the stated strategic aim of becoming a Reserve currency, those roles should be there to call it out.

                    As an adjunct to the last point, Marketing / Brand needs more commitment from the DAO and the leadership team than what is shown here. If there is one thing that the DAO consistently does poorly it is this. Consistent discussion in the community on this point shows that there are issues there and while obviously there has been some acknowledgement of this I also don't see that it should be left under the purview of only one Council member (I make no suggestion that Apollo won't do a great job of it, just that this is an area where there is obvious weakness and it needs more than passing mention).

                    My point around marketing and communications (and previous discussions around crisis communications in the DAO work channel many moons ago) is also focused on the fact that this move is very likely to blow up no matter how it is put to the community. The discussion here has been pretty healthy and I think most people in this discussion, no matter how much they'd like this to be two votes, can see it will likely go to one purely based on the urgent need to see a new leadership structure and responsibilities put in place. The discussion around this in the community will be a lot less forgiving and the comms plan around this one is going to be really important. I want to be really clear that this is not a Discord post and a tweet - outward comms on this one should include:

                    • Re-affirmation of Olympus strategic goals
                    • Current situation - clear view of strengths and wins, weaknesses and issues and background situation (to the extent that it doesn't create more issues than it solves!)
                    • Reasoning for the Council and the strategy behind this, including clear views on time-limits, methodology for changing members etc
                    • Council Member background, history with the DAO, Accountability and responsibilities
                    • Reporting methods, timeframes, update platforms etc

                    Worth noting that my own views on the people suggested for the Council are really positive and I do think moving to this model is positive - how it is done in context is of utmost importance and my earlier comments were based on that - if expediency is key and we move forward in the currently suggested way then engaging the community (and the DAO itself) around the positive outcomes of the change will be the key to its success.