• General

  • Launch an Operator-Free Cooler Loan Clearinghouse

0xFelix to answer these:

  1. I suggest gOHM because it has a delegate() function which allows borrowers to participate in governance, and OHM does not. If gOHM is phased out it would make no difference between the two, besides the marginal gas cost of staking/unstaking.
  2. My calculations from 25 tracked protocol addresses shows ~$3,142 backing per gOHM ($188.5m / 60k circ), so it does not come out above RFV (though it is at the slightly-lower-than-reality dashboard figure). I can share these addresses if there is not a publicly posted list already (help, anyone?). Keep in mind that CVX position has unlocked and AURA position unlocks in coming weeks. My opinion is that, within some margin (i.e. 5%), the closer to backing these are, the better. A topic for debate, I suppose.
  3. I see diminished treasury management as a positive. I think that if individuals want to go out and hold defi coins and even ETH, they have every right to, but it is detrimental when done on a protocol level. I think this applies to your fourth point as well. Again, a topic for debate. When it comes to contract security (putting aside that the Cooler protocol seems extraordinarily simple), this would follow a second audit. As to the question of sizing, I struggle to see how you can gate the accessible liquidity without arbitrarily placing holders into different classes of "get loan"/"don't get loan". I think all or none should be entitled to access -- this was the issue I saw with the Operator in the initial proposal.

    hOHMwardbound new loan origination could be prevented on the DAI set by removing the treasury permission to access DAI; then a new clearinghouse could be set up lending ETH. I would see that as the way to transition from one to the other. Rollover would persist though, yes. I don't think having both concurrently would work well but to be honest, it is hard to conceptualise and I've mostly put it aside.

    Joel33 the proposal does prioritise holders over the protocol itself, but it does so knowing that it benefits all holders equally. I see this as the same dynamic in which staking emissions benefit holders more than the protocol. That is why targeting some fed-funds related rate does not make sense to me. Regarding the difference between Vendor and Cooler, I see it as having a strict loan-to-collateral versus a loan-to-value. Vendor uses an oracle to determine price, then lends a percentage of that price. Cooler lends an amount per collateral token. Vendor might be better for other tokens but in this case, with the concept of backing, I see Cooler as superior. There is also the matter of needless expense on fees, which you point out.

          Thanks for advancing this proposal @nicnombre

          I am (very) supportive in the form put forward and believe this is overdue. My main feedback is around the LTV level as outlined below.

          Fundamentally OHM exists to be a highly capital efficient defi native currency for its holders. I believe this functionality leverages the unique advantages of Olympus relative to other third party borrow / lend platforms.

          Re the interest rate: I think a nominal rate of 0.33% or 0.5% is appropriate in the context of the service provided to OHM holders and the risk profile. I believe this is FAR less risky to the protocol than depositing DAI in Maker DSR for 1%. That is because Olympus can always deal with the collateral by taking and removing from the supply. This is what makes the facility unique.

          Re gOHM: I still think gOHM is the appropriate collateral because we do not have certainty over how the base staking rate will be resolved in the future (particularly if bonding resumes in a material fashion). It is also beneficial for the protocol to have protection in this regard - i.e. the collateral is not diluted away by the staking rate.

          Re gOHM collateral value or loan LTV: I think there is some merit in having a buffer here given we are not 100% stables in the treasury and at the extreme this could effectively be a wind-down of the treasury (i.e. if all holders participated). My proposal is to set the max borrow at 85-90% of backing per gOHM. This creates value for non-participants in the event of default (essentially an inverse bond at 10% premium) and / or it creates an incentive for the borrower to repay their loan and unlock their more valuable collateral.

          Most importantly, let's press forward with this with some urgency.

          0xFelix

          The idea that anyone should pay above 1% for borrowing against the reserve currency of defi is absurd - the token is backed

          We will continue to be poorly regarded as an asset where the protocol allows our holders to be feasted upon for ridiculous borrowing premiums which form the very business model of a number of projects

          A low borrowing rate is essential to establishing OHM as a defi reserve currency - this or a similar proposal needs to be progressed urgently

          The treasury team framework will still be required even if this proposal passes in full

              Mark11 The interest rate in lending markets is not set based on whether an asset is "backed" or not. I'm just pointing out that it will not be possible for any third party to compete against this highly subsidized rate. That has nothing to do with the backing composition of OHM/gOHM, but rather with the economics of running a lending market in DeFi which has certain expenses.

              By doing this we will be massively reducing the desirability of listing OHM in any third party lending markets and that is something that should be taken into account. We can say that OHM is the "reserve currency of defi" but if it's not actually used and or listed in DeFi applications, how true is that statement?

                  nicnombre Just seen the recent proposal wrt DSR rate increasing to 3.33%, which deters me even more from a 0.5% rate.

                  Vendor is also loan-to-collateral via it's "Lend Ratio". This can either be determined by 25/50/75% of the current asset price or more specifically set at a # of tokens per collateral (i.e. 2,500 DAI per gOHM). See image below. They also don't charge any fees to the lender (i.e. Olympus); however, they do charge a fee to the borrower (i.e. Ohmies). These are my reasonings why I say they are carbon copies, which seems awkward imo.

                      Mark11 The cost to borrow the world's reserve currency is ~ 5% and OHM as the reserve currency of defi is still only a goal. An interest rate of 0.5% exposes the protocol to too much leverage. We all remember what happened last time cheap liquidity was granted to users who do not fully understand leverage.

                      I'd argue that adoption is more important than cheap liquidity for OHM to be successful and we do not help ourselves by undercutting other protocols and taking away the profitability of an OHM integration.

                          0xFelix since these have a defined loan-to-collateral, it does not mean third party loans cannot exist, it just means they need to happen at a higher loan-to-collateral. Let's use Vesta as an example -- those loans would make sense again (under proposal terms) if gOHM trades above $4500; you would now be able to borrow more than 3,000 VSTA per gOHM put down. I don't think it makes any sense to give loans and interest to third party lenders right now because the protocol takes on all the risk for them with RBS, and they just cash checks. You can make an argument for opportunity cost but all of the current options are protocols minting stablecoins to provide the loans, so that concept is kind of null.

                          Joel33 that is not really true -- according to their docs, Vendor takes 10% of interest (which is paid to the protocol) and 3% of the defaulted collateral (also paid to the protocol). Charging the additional interest fee up front does not really mean its not taken from the lender, and the default fee could be a huge cost.

                          notSHAFT I think the biggest differences between this and Rari (9,9) days is that these loans do not have liquidations and they are not written as a percentage of market value. What happened back then was: borrow -> buy -> borrow more (since price is higher) -> buy -> etc until liquidated -> sell -> liquidated more -> sell -> etc. Neither side of that recursive loop exists here.

                          hOHMwardbound considering the replies talking about timeline, could we get some discussion on dating a preliminary vote to move forward?

                                    nicnombre Ah, the docs will be outdated now as they recently launched a "V2" and so those fees have been superseded. They now use a 0.3% flat fee, paid by the borrowers. So the lender (i.e. Olympus) gets 100% of both interest and any defaulted collateral. Should of clarified this in my other comments to avoid this confusion.

                                      nicnombre 5 days rfc? It's a proposal with a lot of potential implications and we have the holiday weekend to contend with for discussion. Let's plan a community call, when works for you?

                                          @nicnombre so does this mean that we end up being somewhat pegged to backing? Does this ultimately stop any sort of price appreciation?

                                            nicnombre Thanks for the clarification. I do believe something like cooler loans is needed to create a rate arb and bring down the cost to collateralized OHM, but by going as far south as 0.5% we will nonetheless release animal spirits and undercut ourselves as a cost. That doesn't make a lot of sense to me. An interest rate of 3.3% seems more appropriate IMO.

                                            It would be beneficial for you to talk with the team/community so we can be aligned on more conservative subscription terms before this is moved to an OIP. As things stand it is a bit of an overreach. My suggestion would be for you to bring 3 subscription terms to Discord and we can discuss and vote on what makes the most sense.

                                                Shpadoinkal Short answer - no. Long answer - this likely drives us back to a premium. Because users with a higher risk profile than the treasury will see this as a very attractive way to have exposure to OHM and participate in other defi opportunities. It is essentially a call option on the success of OHM. Plus, I expect some to loop this by depositing OHM, borrowing DAI, and then purchasing OHM. This could provide the demand and exit velocity needed to restart the flywheel. Which ultimately is what is needed to recommence bonding and help OHM achieve its goal

                                                    ruby33 yup had a good chat in discord with hOHMwardbound and @nicnombre and this proposal now makes way more sense to me..I think parameters as is makes a lot of sense too. I'm all for this now that I've gone a little deeper.

                                                          Shpadoinkal great to hear as this is a very logical path for me and one of the few things I’ve felt strongly about in a while

                                                            0xFelix it is already used and listed in defi. Think of this proposal as liquity recognising that ETH is a reserve asset and setting the floor on borrowing against it at 0.5%. It makes ETH more useful not less, even if it boxes out other protocol's business cases.

                                                            If competitors can compete with the interest rate they will, if they can't they won't

                                                            We don't need to live under an inefficient market system that says a backed token needs a 6% interest rate - as a community we can use the treasury to set the market rate and others can build a network of products and services around that.

                                                            We have an advantage over other protocols wanting to be the reserve currency, we have a treasury! and we should use it to box out the competition!! The best way to do that is to ensure it is regarded as a prisitine collateral with best in class rates and this proposal provides a vehicle for doing that

                                                              Finally LFG! Seems to me objections are about other protocols but this is something for holders. That’s where the focus needs to be. How to put ohmies first.

                                                              notSHAFT don't we want these spirit animals of there are no liquidations? Why would we not want as much looping to drive to a premium as possible?

                                                                Devil's advocate (on perhaps a bigger issue): Wouldn't this give out essentially a free hedge to short the Endgame uncertainty? (1,2,3,4) Does Olympus really want to lock in an oracle-less exposure to DAI at this time? If DAI goes to peanuts, that's 175m trapped with no way to escape, no?