- Edited
Interesting to see the update! And agree that a model without an operator makes more sense. Few thoughts though:
- Considering the staking rate reduction plan I would rather see loans against OHM, especially with the proposed loan terms (at the end of which gOHM will effectively have been phased out already).
- I understand the argumentation on the interest rate but I think undercutting the market to this extend is a bad idea for two reasons. First, if this is implemented at scale it will limit the adoption of OHM as an asset in external lending markets since it will be impossible for others to compete against this subsidized rate. Second, 0.5% is below today's baseline yield strategy for DAI (DSR @1%) while it carries significantly more risk for the treasury. Considering those two points I think it makes more sense to target a rate closer to today's market rate (4%-6%) which is less risky and carries more upside for the protocol.
- Margin of safety: the proposal of 3,000 DAI per gOHM is actually above the liquid backing of OHM today which, at the time of writing, is $2997. If the protocol were to lend at scale at these terms I think it makes sense to lower this to $2,500/gOHM to guarantee a margin of safety - which would also be more in line with the Vendor/Myso pilot deposits. Maybe worth mentioned as well, is that there is a risk here that this programme becomes an RFV vehicle to exit above liquid backing (which itself is already higher than the market price). I don't think that the protocol should encourage that and/or open up that opportunity.
- The sizing ask is very significant and would prevent any other allocation or strategies that the treasury team has been working on (it would also invalidate the new treasury framework). Plus it would concentrate all of the assets into a single audited, but not battle-tested, contract. I think it would be much more prudent to do a pilot deposit similar to TAP-21 and evaluate the results.
- "Volatile treasury assets are consolidated into stable coins." This seems to go against recent community votes to favour a more volatile backing over stablecoins. Would you mind expanding on this point?