dr00 I think incur debt should be repurposed as a means to provide governance power to some LPs (use OHM for LP to borrow gOHM) instead of as a means to provide LP to some governance holders (use gOHM to borrow OHM for LP). the biggest benefit imo is that providing liquidity is a permissionless activity (which is not true with existing incur debt paradigm).

    1. Will the ohm be "sold" into the LPs, or will it be added 50/50 with treasury deposits? How will any change in the xyk ratio be handled if so?
      • E.g. if When ohm hits 1,000 there will be a huge IL -- if treasury provided the USD then the IL is quite larger (although it's a good trade for the treasury!).
    2. If the policy team believes a ratio of LP to MCap of 20% is ideal, where do you see the mechanisms changing to still enable that lever? Would it be that the protocol, over time, would exit and enter the LP (and thus allow stakers to own a larger %) to maintain that ratio? Or would there be an amount of "allowed" ohm rebasing to enter and exit the LP?
    • Zeus replied to this.

      @Zeus When you say circulating supply do you mean circulatingSupply_ as defined on the Staking distributor contract? So only staked supply is taken into account?

      Check your discord DM btw

      • Zeus replied to this.

        BathtubToaster

        1. not sold, added. leverages the 'sync()' function of a v2 pair, which updates the internal balances and changes k. i.e. you mint in 1% of the pool and sync, the formula changes from xy=k to x(y*1.01)=k(1.01).
        2. intent is to maintain a ratio of LP to treasury and not LP to MCap. LP to MCap will increase over time as M&S weights price lower and increases LP. liquidity could get very thin at highs, but reserves will be there to match at whatever ratio, and over time it will correct to a lower state. might be more to think about here though as that delay could be to slow in some cases (though the walls seek to prevent such situations).

            Can someone clarify (and pls edit the text of the proposal afterwards so it is crystal clear for voters) whether implementing No. 1 - "Implement Mint and Sync with no change to reward rate." would actually decrease staking emissions and if so, if this option is preferable for the health of the protocol. Thx.

              Interesting proposal.

              Some questions?

              1. Would this make LP bonds obsolete? If so, are any other bonds being considered or bonding will stop when below backing since reserve bonds are also stopped? (probably a policy question). This & also adding via LP bonds just keeps increasing LP supply at current price. Reducing volatility in price. This is good for price support, however not as good for price discovery.

              2. Wouldn't this suppress and provide a downward pressure on the LP price as the values of K change? If the calculation is changed from total to circulating, in the event a large number of folks decide to unstake, the emissions keep falling with the possibility of going into downward cycle.

              3. Is this a turn on and turn off decided by policy, or when implemented will be "always on" ?

              Apologies if questions are wrong, just trying to clarify the intent here.

              SUBGURU agree that this would be helpful - had a look at the table above, I'll personally always lean towards sustainability which means I've tended towards Implement with no change, be good to understand on a deeper level what that means in practice as far as sustainability…

                Zeus I am all for the good of the project and long term sustainability so would vote in favour of implementation with a increase in reward rate.

                    wdwickham ‘no increase’. I am sure I am dyslexic or is that dyslexzzzyhh. Sorry

                      1. definition of liquidity
                      2. liquidity vs ubiquity
                      3. uniswap v2 legacy tech
                      4. implementation
                      5. utilities

                      Definition and measure of liquidity
                      Liquidity refers to the ease with which an asset, or security, can be converted into ready cash without affecting its market price. The key in this definition of liquidity should be "without affecting its price". Liquidity should not be defined as "TVL in v2 pools" divided by treasury. Rather it should be referred to as "how big transaction do we want to be able to process while containing price slippage to less than 0.1 % ?"
                      Only legacy uniswap v2 technology is restricted to a linear relationship. v3 as you know has multiples higher efficiency, so we need to separate the liquidity concept from the mental trap of linear xyk pools.

                      Liquidity vs ubiquity
                      Another distinction is to separate liquidity (price slippage) from ubiquity (presence in every nook and cranny). While the first allows one to trade in and out without penalty, the second serves to hopefully see somebody hodl the token for sustained time (remove supply). Ubiquity should not be a goal in itself - slippage and supply removal is.

                      Implementation
                      While I see bleed in the Treasury's own LP positions, I do not see why the same must be a problem for 3rd party liquidity providers. Anyone that wants to avoid the dilution of holding OHM in an LP, could simply chose to use gOHM instead of OHM. So why are we adding complexities to solve a problem that is already solved by using gOHM as the pairing token?

                      v2 legacy tech
                      This proposal builds upon uniswaps v2 xyk logic, right? Why would Olympus marry itself to legacy logic? I fear this is a technology trap where Olympus deploys logic that builds on somebody else's old, inefficient v2 technology instead of looking forward and really maximizing the potential of v3 or possibly in-house AMM technologies.

                      Utility
                      a) Incentivizing others to provide liquidity works to weaken the pooper2 paper. Walls are walls only when Olympus has monopoly on liquidity. The more distributed ownership of liquidity, the more porous the pooper2 walls will be.
                      b) Promoting 3rd parties to participate in 3rd party AMM's promotes and strengthens 3rd party AMM's ecosystems. It does not strengthen so much Olympus ecosystem.
                      c) In my vision, Olympus does a 100x better job at marketing and delivering its own products than currently. In my vision, people visit app.olympus.finance to access liquidity, to buy and sell OHM - they dont visit 3rd party AMM's. While visiting olympus.finance they discover they can price time through discounts and premiums through bonding. While visiting olympus.finance they discover Pro opportunities and snap up some partner tokens. By visiting olympus.finance they find a dynamic marketplace - worth revisiting on daily basis to look for opportunities. By creating this interest and traffic, partners are increasingly interested to join and build on Olympus ecosystem.

                        As has been mentioned already, some added clarification on the voting choices I feel is needed. "No change to reward rate" COULD be understood to mean that the APY will not change from its current range level. "Change to reward rate" COULD be understood to mean that the current APY will change and drop from its current range level. It's imperative that each choice is fully understood.

                        I speak on behalf of myself, an ohmie currently 85%+ percent down and came around November time. Personally the current reward rate projection is one of the things that keeps me going when the price of OHM is down. I would rather change the reward rate than no change.

                        Also for the long picture, if OHM is to be a reserve currency but also a very 3% to 6% for the institutions that would rather play save with their fund and (stake or bond) seems attractive proposition. 2% to 4% seems rather low. But then again what will happen to fiat currency at that point, we don't know till we travel there.

                        I guess I probably would be enticed by "no change" if we were in our bond centric future and ability to get more yield was an option.

                        Zeus The way the choices are expressed confused me. you say "Implementing this with no change to the reward rate will result in lower emissions in staking". But then no change is in the same 470% region. I voted 'with change' hoping to achieve the end result of keeping emissions the same. But in reality this option was 'no change'.

                        • json replied to this.

                            Re: reward rate change. I am thinking it would be more beneficial to maintain the current APY (increase reward rate) for two reasons:

                            1. perception- yes Olympus will be defending with the treasury but the decrease in APY at the same time may create the appearance of unsustainability.

                            2. We need to keep increasing supply. There's only like 17million OHM. Reducing emissions again so early seems counterproductive over the long-term.

                            I feel the safest choice is implement with increased reward rate. If we find that this rate of emissions is impeding the progress of OIP-93, a reward rate reduction OIP can be proposed to adjust.

                              asho There is no change because a portion of the rewards will go to LPs as opposed to only stakers.