Sadinoel

  • Aug 26, 2022
  • Joined Oct 6, 2021
  • This proposal would be a lot stronger if you guys had finished fundraising, was fully doxxed etc…but you probably need this OIP cleared as part of your marketing to VC's. I get it.

    Unmask first (I swear, if this is you Dani..)

    • The real-world legal entity we form that sits on the board of Bond Protocol, should have air-tight terms with this real-world legal entity (if this proposal passes) that prevents it from acting as a super-bloc to act in the interests of its shareholders (profit-driven motives no doubt) against the majority consensus of the DAO.

    • Sounds good - is there a public face to this? Legal entity, doxxed team etc?

      Also…permitting this bond hands over a large portion of DAO control to a single entity

      • Woah.

        I caught some of this in Policy yesterday but got the wrong end of the stick so need some clarification please sers..

        Firstly, Inverse Bonds…does this now mean whenever OHM price is ABOVE the "Buy" part of (wall, wall) Inverse Bonds turn on - or; only if the moving average bottom price falls WITHIN that bottom range, Inverse Bonds are triggered, or; Inverse Bonds trigger if the "Buy" wall runs out of powder and price falls BELOW that range?

        At the point IB is triggered (is this manually issued still or programatically?) users can start exchanging OHM for assets from the treasury, at a premium to market price - correct?

        If so, this is concerning to me as it starts a precedence of the protocol (dipping into its savings account) in order to scale back previous success in OHM printing. Is this a legitimate concern?

        Sure, we burn the OHM which MAY assist price…but it feels a waste to get rid of that OHM…the whole point is to build thick OHM liquidity. It feels counterproductive to burn it.

        We should also be looking at ways to aid the protocol in protecting its treasury.

        My understanding is we are just looking at ways to direct the OHM liquidity (of which there is a lot) to stabilise price, right? I don't think this should be done at the cost of losing treasury assets.

        The treasury should be "Liquidity Provider of Last Resort" - similar to a central banks role of "Lender of Last Resort."

        OIP-93 allows users to provide AMM liquidity and receive their OHM in LP token form as a rebase and AMM fee's in exchange for some Impermanent Loss, right?

        Can we not use a mechanism, whenever we fall to the bottom price range of the 120 day moving average where the protocol "soft rugs" by uncoupling LP's on AMM's and incentivise's stakers to provide liquidity in its stead to AMM pools in exchange for:

        - AMM fee's
        - Regular rebase rewards at normal rate as per OIP-18
        - The unpaired OHM as an additional reward for taking on the role of primary LP (which hopefully offsets IL)

        Drying up OHM liquidity on exchanges works the same way burning it does, except its not permanent.
        The treasury gets to keep its LP pair-assets and redeploy.

        No OHM is handed in for burning...instead becoming an LP is incentivised for a higher OHM reward rate.

        Then once price rises, protocol becomes the main LP again. (Or maybe we keep stakers as main LP's to soak up the excess OHM from breaking LP's until we hit equilibrium).

      • BTCBrian start your problem-solving from the viewpoint of: How does the treasury take in more assets? Through long-term lockups or Zeus' proposal above.

        But some good thoughts, I will read your thread 👌

        • I like this idea - but I also think if any project is accepted, Olympus should become majority signer on Multisig of the projects Treasury (unless they have already achieved full on-chain governance).

          Edit: Also, how does this work for projects who hold OHM in their treasury? We don't want a situation where we end up backing OHM with OHM…

          • What will having this much OHM unstaked do to our APY? Has this been calculated?

          • Dreamboat …also, I think giving investors a "potential" escape hatch gives them more confidence to take a larger risk - so on a psychological level, KNOWING that there is, in essence, an insurance policy on their OHM should be beneficial for the protocol in the long-term

            • Dreamboat I feel you ser, this was my worry - but apparently its being done in a way that shouldn't impact treasury…Still wrapping my smol brain around it but I trust the policy team…just still in the process of verifying…someone like @Asfi or @sh4d0w would be able to explain better than I…or Father @Zeus

            • aazaad

              If you don't have 3,3 you don't have inflation control;

              Which means you don't have bond issuance;

              Which means you don't have treasury assets;

              Which means you don't have expanding OHM supply;

              Which means you don't have expanding treasury supply;

              Which means you don't have expanding value;

              Which means you don't have OHM buy pressure;

              Which means you drop below RFV intrinsic value;

              Which means treasury burns away trying to maintain above RFV;

              Which means OHM dies.

              • Also, to be clear, I think we should stick to the original "buybacks occur if we drop below intrinsic RFV" because Inverse Bonds currently feels too reactive to current market conditions and increases the surface area of any potential attacks on the treasury.

                However, I understand some members have lower risk tolerance than others so a solution to offset their current pain is important but NOT to the long-term health of the protocol.

                • abipup backing IS maintained…as long as there is $1 RFV for every OHM in existence..

                • abipup I get that…but the treasury gets depleted with each sell, right?

                  Why is this good?

                  Also, does it effect runway?