bubbidubb

I think this is good step.

Important however as clear from the docs:

"Olympus is run by OlympusDAO. […] Our eventual goal is to build an autonomous system at the protocol level"

It needs to be very clear what a purchase of OHM token represents. Rhetorically: If I acquire all OHM - what do I get?

The divisions you present, represent an internal structure similar to a corporation could have a NAFTA division, EMEA division, APAC division. Or it could have "Sales", "Operations", "Marketing" etc. The result and status of the individual entities are interesting, but quite irrelevant from external perspective.

The most relevant perspective is what the consolidated statements look like. Who cares if "operations" are negative -100 if "sales" is up "+150" … Same goes here. Until the day Olympus is 100% self-playing and autonomous, the music stops playing if the DAO assets are left at 0.

Therefore, I approve the division, but the representation on web Dashboard and Treasury Reports will become like navel gazing since they only provide a limited (sub-optimal) perspective. It should be made available for external parties, the consolidated statements.

So what DO I get if I acquire all OHM assets? I should get control and ownership of all the non-OHM assets regardless of which division is holding them. So that is the main data I care about as an external party.

abipup

The purpose of safeguarding reserves would be to secure project longevity, and to maintain/build market confidence in the project and its valuation. This project is very experimental, and an ambitious vision such as creating the world's decentralized reserve currency is going to take a lot more than 2 years from today. The experimentation, iteration, innovation and engineering required to reach the vision will require a tons of funding. Reserves = funding.

Also, at the extreme sad end of it, wouldn't there just be:
1 last OHM left,
0 liquid backing left
32.5M worth of vested assets
Might be a good deal for the OHM owner, assuming ofc that the vested assets really are worth 32.5M and transferrable?

Fun picture: US Treasury seems to have been running Inverse Bonds on their gold between 1960-1970 until they realized its not going to end well and said to hell with our commitment; nobody is gonna claim no more of our reserves.

abipup

Replied, but the post is stuck in "Awaiting approval"

abipup

I come from the corner where Preservation of Capital is paramount. Hence I would like to see that the burn rate of Liquid Backing follows a curve similar to the look of:
f(x) = 1 / x
where f(x) represents dollar amount of Liquid Backing remaining in Treasury and x represents time
rather than the proposed capacity sizing that seems to follow the linear type of curve such as
f(x) = a - b*x

The proposed capacity sizing seems to enable Liquid Backing to linearly hit 0? Game over.
A 1/x type of curve should ensure there will always be at least some Liquid Backing left.

So far we have spent (my understanding) $54m on price propping through IB. 54m USD corresponds to 540 man years of highly skilled 1st world engineering labor. We still have about 2,000 man years remaining in Treasury to reach the vision of a decentralized reserve currency.

Suggestion #1: Capacity sizing
Suggest to determine market capacity not in terms of absolutes but rather relatives (or mix of both). Meaning the capacity proposal says like “$1.67m” currently. But there should be a limit such as “max 0.5% of liquid backing to be offered per week”.

Suggestion #2: Dashboard
Suggest to remove the greeting screen on “OHM Backing” on the Olympus Dashboard. This is a depressive greeting. Whether OHM or gOHM – its always gonna be pretty depressive. What IB should help with though is that IB really entices sellers to offload at about 20% premium while advertised as 0.8% discount. This gain for the protocol should be the greeting screen. Meaning a greeting screen such as “Market Value per OHM or gOHM” should trend upwards much easier than “Liquid Backing per OHM”. Thats the essence of IB, and should be visualized as a more optimistic greeting screen; getting peeps to offload at LB/unit while visualizing MV/unit. The larger the true gap between LB (or actually, the effective bond price) and MV the better.

Suggestion #3: Dashboard
If you don’t want to do suggestion #2, then remove the half of LP’s still included in liquid backing. This value drops together with OHM price and puts a depressing slant on the liquid backing value despite IB working to increase total backing/unit.

Suggestion #4: Definitions
Use easily verifiable denominators.
“Floating” supply is a furbished or cooked number. It adds “trust” into the valuation process. Not good. Do not fall for temptation to cook data. Use verifiable total supply. It is what it is.
Same goes for “gOHM supply”, which is a derivative value. Use “OHM supply”.

Do burn and re-mint-- because it cleans up your house – do not just subjectively reclassify it as “out of circulation” when you can anytime bring it back to circulation. Trustless matters.

Suggestion #5: Definitions
Be conservative with the valuation of non-liquid backing assets. And be clear with how the valuation is determined and when/how it is to be revaluated. The “vesting assets” (pKLIMA, pBTRFLY and what not) valuation seems to have been stuck for a while at $32.5m despite the general market tanking.

1. How will OHM Bonds function? How do they impact supply?

2. I am surprised to learn that DAO did not follow OIP-94, didnt burn the OHMs from Inverse Bonds. If DAO says/implies it will do one thing through an OIP, it should reasonably follow through on that action. This is important for credibility. If you want to play with a fudged up number like floating or circulating to make things look better than they really are, then you are always in a vulnerable position and need to be even more crisp and true with intent and actions. I would just forget about fudgable and tweakable data like circulating. Be clear, keep it simple and clean up the mess. If people think you burned, and you didnt. Its not good.

BTW… The action proposed above:

Post-Merge ETHPOW chain: remove all ETHPOW liquidity, send ETHPOW to an exchange (how to do is TBD), trade all for ETHPOS, send to ETHPOS mainnet Treasury

You would need to remove any ETH-OHM pair liquidity on block 1-n, because OHM's relative value on ETHPOW should drop towards 0 on ETHPOW already on block 1. This means an OHM-ETH pool will be left with only OHM's and no ETH's already on block 1 or 2.

This is a great write-up and initiative to focus energy and add transparency through a clear vision statement and a connected strategy. This write-up will have a good educationary value, and I hope it will be published somewhere suitable so people may find it easily.

Some comments:

1. I would shift the definition of reserve currency to the vision statement - not likely to change.
2. You may want to split the definition into 3 parts for increased clarity:
   a. "Currency" definition
   b. "Reserve" definition
   c. What enables or facilitates a currency to be chosen as "reserve currency" (strategy)
3. The "currency" definition I am too lazy to lookup but its the yada yada about being used and thus circulating. Like water in a stream. Its a current. Hence currency. Medium of exchange, store of value, unit of account, etc.
4. The "reserve" definition is where it gets interesting. A currency "earns" its classification as "reserve" when it is held by many monetary authorities/institutions. Your bullet point 3. Thats the simple definition. Why? Because once they hold it, it goes into their balance sheet and it gets classified as a "reserve" for them once they do their financial reporting/auditing. It is how those monetary institutions use the currency that makes it a "reserve currency". Just like Olympus holds a number of assets on the balance sheet - they are reserve currencies from Olympus accounting perspective. Once other protocols hold OHM on their balance sheet, OHM becomes a reserve currency for them.
5. The other 4 bullet points in your referenced definition are what makes a currency interesting for others to use as "reserve currency". These 4 are the way for OHM to become appealing as reserve currency; ie liquidity and stability.

A crisp understanding of the "reserve" concept will be critical for long-term success.

Good stuff.

2 concerns:

1. US sanctioned Tornado Cash associated addresses and (defi) fedFi is turning to adherence it seems. Hearing that Olympus has created/is creating a Swiss legal entity for Olympus - I suppose there is no other option available for Olympus but to also follow the sanctions? If yes, then all investments Olympus does must also be confirmed to follow sanctions, or they pose legal risk to Olympus and investment value drop to zero. This basically goes for all Olympus assets - in this case now - will Balancer/Aura also follow sanction regulations?

2. Balancer has a mere 250 MUSD market cap. Not exactly a prime asset from investment perspective - even though we may like both the team and their service. I would caution against diversification of focus and capital. Olympus already is still too complicated, and the more knicks are added, the more difficult it will be to understand Olympus. Market investors dont like muddiness. If Balancer is really awesome, then why not go big and do a full M&A instead of just an energy consuming nibble?

2 concerns:

1. US sanctioned Tornado Cash associated addresses and (defi) fedFi is turning to adherence it seems. Hearing that Olympus has created/is creating a legal entity supporting Olympus - I suppose there is no other option available for Olympus but to also follow the sanctions? If yes, then all investments Olympus does must also be confirmed to follow sanctions, or they pose legal risk to Olympus and investment value drop to zero. This basically goes for all Olympus assets - in this case now - will Balancer/Aura also follow sanction regulations?
2. Balancer has a mere 250 MUSD market cap. Not exactly a prime asset from investment perspective - even though we may like both the team and their service. I would caution against diversification of focus and capital. Olympus already is still too complicated, and the more knicks are added, the more difficult it will be to understand Olympus. Market investors dont like muddiness. If Balancer is really awesome, then why not go big and do a full M&A instead of just an energy consuming nibble?

This is actually an important topic, and may tie into a choice between gamification and academia. Here follows maybe an academical approach to support transparency and credibility. (without any arguing against a gamification track)

First, to create the proper reference… Maybe Olympus could align with the common fiat terminology around money supply/stock: https://businessterms.org/money-supply/

M1 = cash, notes and similar financial instruments used as a medium of exchange.
M2 = M1 plus those financial instruments that act as a store of value.
M3 = M1 plus M2 plus like repurchase agreements.

In Olympus case this could translate to:
M1 = unstaked OHM
M2 = unstaked OHM + staked OHM (including those vesting in bond depository contract)
M3 = … if relevant… maybe if pOHM still exists.. maybe M3 = M1 + M2 + pOHM implications. otherwise skip M3.

We could then talk about M1 growth per time unit and M2 growth per time unit.

What is currently referred to as APY or "reward yield" in the staking UI corresponds to tradfi "overnight rate": https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/overnightrate.asp

In the United States, the overnight rate is referred to as the federal funds rate, while in Canada, it is known as the policy interest rate.

In Olympus case, it could thus make sense to rename APY to "policy interest rate" and rename "reward yield" to "overnight rate". And then explain that at Olympus there are 3 nights per 24-hour cycle.

I would expect:
M1 < M2 < M3
M1 growth < M2 growth

A staker would prefer to see:
overnight rate >= M2 growth (should be the case currently while bonds are off)

Overnight rate may sound and promote short-term mindsets in regards to staking…. Mmm.. But thats probably what it will happen anyway once internal bonds develop in volume?

Mixed and hesitant emotion. But also delighted to hear v3 is on its way.

After reading the RFC, comments above and listening to the cohmunity call I am holding these beliefs:
- A split will sharpen the focus of "OP team", as well the "reserve currency team"
- Sharpened focus will speed up development, time to market and increase overall quality and control
- DeFi overall will benefit the better and faster these teams can launch products/services

Productivity will increase, and productivity is a public good.

The "tokenomics" or game theory of who gains, and who loses value is not addressed in the proposal so cant really comment on that. But to me, that is neither the main point. If it serves a public good, then that is the way to go.

I did once propose a "unified market place" to drive more volume to OP, but maybe it makes sense to keep and increase the separation just like its separated in tradfi between the Federal Treasury Bond market and the corporate bond market. Even more so if the target customers of the different bond types are likely to diverge come the future.

Good move. ️

Bonus amounts
The communications around 3,3 and high APY's set a tone, and expectations. But our backdrop is now a 95% drawdown from the peak. This is pain for 3,3. Ultimately, the buck stops with someone. And in this case SO could only be considered to be the DAO even if it feels unfair. The Gainz chart is further giving an update on where the 3,3 community stands in terms of pain:

With this as context, awarding the top with a possible half a million USD feels rich. Half a million buys 3 family villas from where I come from, and probably like 2 Ferraris from where you come from. And that's a bonus achievable in a time period of 6 months from now with this backdrop?

I find the base level salaries to be high, but to get good people that is very competitive and attractive for the best. The bonus level however is out of touch with the real world, the community, and with the quality and the value of what has been delivered to the market. If you are losing top resources because the compensation is too low, just announce it and we will see if we cannot scramble appropriate replacements. Just ensure that proper hand-over documentation is continuously being maintained by every key resource so that we have something to put in the hands of new contributors. Also remember, these amounts will eventually hit the market as sell orders and not only drain DAO funds but drop market cap too.

Bonus goals
The reason for conditionality is that bonus should not be a given. If so, it should be part of base salary and not referred to as bonus. Bonus is not a right. Getting to top 90 plus increasing Treasury at same time is a challenge as it requires Olympus to be better than other projects, rather than just riding the market. Don't know how to explain myself clearer.

Runway
The compensation model needs to rest on a plan for transitioning to being sustained from revenue and not assets. Runway should be indefinite. If we cant get to sustainability, then why are we burning assets at all?

Compensation payouts @shadow
Why my tone.. I know there are very detailed google drive docs, but I think we should be able to follow DAO payouts on-chain. On-chain I would expect to see monthly recurring patterns of payouts corresponding to the compensation framework in number of transactions/contributors and value. I would expect to be able to track the exchange rate of currency conversions to verify that it is aligned with the decided framework and monitor said runway. But when I look at DAO address I get:

Tokens I dont even know of. This is not easily understandable to me, or am I dumb. And the swaps that take place downstream do not help at a glance. Of course I wonder what are Acropolis DAO tokens? How are ODY used and swapped? These are bulk transactions possibly one per compensation and contributor? Or maybe you bulk it in initial trx's and then explode at later stage.. Pls dont answer here, just make it so we dont need to use specialized software to audit or spend hours to puzzle it together.

Suggestions
1. Bonus goals should all require stellar performance by the project - not just fall out depending on what market does
2. Include Gainz chart as bonus condition: a majority of the 3,3 community should be over water for any bonus to be paid out - but the past needs to be left as past at some point - so take January 1, 2022 as the snapshot. Rolling snapshots would be the best ofc.
3. Work on transparency - Information scattered on google drives, unreliable dashboard, outdated dune charts, monthly reports written like sales pitches. So much effort, yet not much credibility. What can I trust? Where should I look? I want to trust.

BTW: We work 24/7 because we love what we do, and the people we do it with. Not because of over-the-top monetary bonuses.

I think I have written enough now. Probably just reiterating my points over and over.

Good initiative. Not relevant to Olympus. So go ahead without Grants.

Olympus needs to get its own s*** going, before disbursing funds externally. And currently Olympus is just barely limping along.

As a long-time, external, diligent student of Olympus I see only 3 values with Olympus on the market:

1. Treasury/DAO funds --- (based on my hope – cant see any trustworthy QC’d data)
2. Discord community
3. Inverse Bonds

Thats it. Thats all we have.
Need products. Need quality control. Need substance. Need credibility.
Stop living in la-la land on community expense.

Thank you hOHMwardbound

Very well-written and well structured. I really like your excellent work. Clearly a lot of thoughts have gone in to framework. Also, big kudos for stream-lining the DAO organization thus far.

Now (and since this is me and I am autistic and unable to phrase myself in humanly palatable sentences), here goes the comments yous wont enjoy:

6 month job security (If I understand this “allocation concept” correct)
I think all can understand that contributors “want” stability and security. But today we live in the age of remote work and location independent assignments. This means we do not need to tear up any roots, or grow roots in a new place to take on work. Because of this, security and stability is less warranted since the contributors “investment” in a new job is less. Also 6 months job security is unheard of except for Wall Street CxO’s who sits with big parachute agreements. If this is what it takes to get your kin to work I suggest we look for alternative resources elsewhere on the globe who are eager, hungry and very capable these days.

Runway
Again, thank you for publishing this key info. But 2.1 – 4.7 year runway is a very uncomfortable runway. $28M needs to last longer than that. Crypto-winter 2018/2019 lasted up to 2 years depending on how you measure. And that was without macro headwinds. This time, we are in new bear and macro looks like total shit. $28M is a shitload of money. Come on, man. 2.1 years?? Must do better.

Bonus goals
Thank you, most of them are S.M.A.R.T objectives. But lets dig in to them:

A. Treasury growth
Reaching 400M end of year is just a mere return to where we were on May 1^st. Come on, man. Who sets a market value based bonus goal just after a crash – taking as reference a crash value? Thats the scandalous stuff they lecture about in business schools, and what goes into the newspapers and gets trad bosses axed. Changing to RFV makes it a bit better, still possible to manipulate though.

B. Premium
We lack credible data on backing to assess this. Also 30d MA of price, or 30d MA on backing – be specific.

C. Decentralized Operations
This is the only non-measurable objective. As such, I don’t like it. I also don’t care much at this point in time. This is an internal pat-your-back kinda thing with unclear implications. We don’t have a product yet. That should be the focus. Get a working product on the market.

D. Ranking
This is good.

AND/OR conditionality:
Essential for bonus payout is that there is AND conditionality between the goals. Payout can only occur if all objectives are met at the same time. If you play with OR here it is a corrupt or silly composition of goals because very little hinges on the performance of the team and almost every objective is just dependent on external market development. If cryptomarket rallies, A is certain to be achieved. B is likely to be achieved. If cryptomarket continues to drop, D is certain to be achieved because of our stables. The only isolated team dependent objective is C – which is not measurable. Bonus should be awarded for things we have accomplished – not what the external market accomplishes for us. The goals are only a challenge if they need to be met in unison. Otherwise its basically free payout.

Bonus amounts
Max bonus = $540.000 ? Paid and measured in USD? No man, come on. Be serious. If you believe in Olympus you own a decent and big stack of OHM. Thats how you get your bonus. Ideally vesting like most other projects to align long-term. Contractually paid half a million in USD? Seriously. Come on. Dont work for Olympus if you don’t want to align your gainz together with the community. No fat cat elite lane of getting fat USD bonus checks please. I sickening myself as I write. Half a million. In income. Look in the mirror! We the community are the ones who have paid up to create your funds, enable your salaries and the Treasury. Many lost almost everything. Is everyone getting paid by the DAO, or how do you get your OIP’s through.. I don’t get it and I don’t even vote anymore, cuz big wallets just crush votes if needed anyway. On chain governance – how is that gonna help to thwart corruption.

Compensation payouts
The payouts from the DAO are extremely difficult to track on-chain. It is as if the DAO is intentionally trying to obfuscate them. Please change to on-chain transparency in payouts. We should be able to follow on-chain the money and see how these funds are managed and possibly impacting user and market behavior including impact on OHM price. Be transparent. Be responsible. Have integrity.

I like the structure you have presented here, but work needs to be done on the content. I will thus vote no on this RFC on basis of content. Structure is excellent.

Thank you for reading.

abipup

1, 2 & 3:
LFG !!!!!!!!!
LFG !!!!!!!!!
LFG !!!!!!!!!

1 question:

In general (not iso to this OIP) - why use MA as price guide, and not some intrinsically based metric? MA dampens only volatility, but says not so much about value guidance?

1. definition of liquidity
2. liquidity vs ubiquity
3. uniswap v2 legacy tech
4. implementation
5. utilities

Definition and measure of liquidity
Liquidity refers to the ease with which an asset, or security, can be converted into ready cash without affecting its market price. The key in this definition of liquidity should be "without affecting its price". Liquidity should not be defined as "TVL in v2 pools" divided by treasury. Rather it should be referred to as "how big transaction do we want to be able to process while containing price slippage to less than 0.1 % ?"
Only legacy uniswap v2 technology is restricted to a linear relationship. v3 as you know has multiples higher efficiency, so we need to separate the liquidity concept from the mental trap of linear xyk pools.

Liquidity vs ubiquity
Another distinction is to separate liquidity (price slippage) from ubiquity (presence in every nook and cranny). While the first allows one to trade in and out without penalty, the second serves to hopefully see somebody hodl the token for sustained time (remove supply). Ubiquity should not be a goal in itself - slippage and supply removal is.

Implementation
While I see bleed in the Treasury's own LP positions, I do not see why the same must be a problem for 3rd party liquidity providers. Anyone that wants to avoid the dilution of holding OHM in an LP, could simply chose to use gOHM instead of OHM. So why are we adding complexities to solve a problem that is already solved by using gOHM as the pairing token?

v2 legacy tech
This proposal builds upon uniswaps v2 xyk logic, right? Why would Olympus marry itself to legacy logic? I fear this is a technology trap where Olympus deploys logic that builds on somebody else's old, inefficient v2 technology instead of looking forward and really maximizing the potential of v3 or possibly in-house AMM technologies.

Utility
a) Incentivizing others to provide liquidity works to weaken the pooper2 paper. Walls are walls only when Olympus has monopoly on liquidity. The more distributed ownership of liquidity, the more porous the pooper2 walls will be.
b) Promoting 3rd parties to participate in 3rd party AMM's promotes and strengthens 3rd party AMM's ecosystems. It does not strengthen so much Olympus ecosystem.
c) In my vision, Olympus does a 100x better job at marketing and delivering its own products than currently. In my vision, people visit app.olympus.finance to access liquidity, to buy and sell OHM - they dont visit 3rd party AMM's. While visiting olympus.finance they discover they can price time through discounts and premiums through bonding. While visiting olympus.finance they discover Pro opportunities and snap up some partner tokens. By visiting olympus.finance they find a dynamic marketplace - worth revisiting on daily basis to look for opportunities. By creating this interest and traffic, partners are increasingly interested to join and build on Olympus ecosystem.