dodecahedron

abipup After at least 1 month of the RBS system being active, the community should re-evaluate the need for this emergency shutdown authority. The hope is that with enough time, the system can be proven enough to warrant a fully autonomous and automated operation.

I get the sentiment here but I don't think we need to telegraph when we will possibly be moving to a fully autonomous operation. We need to find weaknesses in this system sooner rather than later, and putting a (potential) date on things gives some information advantage to a hacker.

Can we make this language a bit vaguer?

Summary

In OIP-85, the community voted in favor of reducing the reward rate to the bottom of the current tier (0.1186%) when certain criteria are met. Unfortunately, the set of criteria listed in that proposal were too ambiguous to actually be implemented by the policy team.

Motivation & Proposal

The rationale for emissions reduction is covered well in the initial RFC and subsequent forum post for OIP-85.

This proposal is to reduce the current reward rate, which was set out in OIP-18 with the expectation that emissions at the current reward rate (0.1587%) would be needed to offset dilution from bonds. When reserve bonds are paused, as they are currently, the significant decrease in dilution from bonding activity allows for emissions to be reduced.

Polling Period

The polling process begins now and will end at 00:00 UTC on 24/04/2022.

Poll

• Yes, reduce the reward rate to 0.1186% when reserve bonds are paused. Return to the reward rate of 0.1587% when reserve bonds are reactivated.
• No, do nothing.

bubbidubb Framing this as an antagonistic, zero-sum vote for "value" going either to the DAO or the community is incorrect and misleading.

Unnecessarily minting more OHM to offset bond emissions that aren't taking place isn't redistributing value--it's just creating unjustified inflation. Yes, this affects the DAO's holdings (which the community should care about as well) but it also has a deleterious effect on the price of OHM, neither of which are positive for stimulating external demand to enter the econOHMy.

electo I'm not quite sure how the underlying premise is flawed here. All reserve bonds (i.e. non LP) are turned off at the moment, meaning stakers are objectively getting less diluted than they would if reserve bonds were turned on.

This seems like a longwinded way of showing that gas is expensive. Rather than reducing sell pressure, this would massively increase it via bond recycling.

bubbidubb So your assumption here is that this whale is looking to offload all of their OHM at the "soft floor" imposed by inverse bonding, rather than selling today or last week or last month at a higher price?

I agree with this sentiment but it's possible it doesn't go far enough. We need to give inverse bonds the best possible chance of achieving your point #2. As you mention in point #1, since there is no minting from bonds there isn't a need to cover bond dilution with reward emissions. I fully appreciate the desire to stay within OIP18--I think forward guidance is an incredibly important tool for a (de)central bank--but we shouldn't be dogmatic about OIP18 if there is a logical reason to improve upon it in light of new tools being developed (inverse bonds, internal bonds, etc.).

So my vote is Agree but I think we need to be prepared to go closer to zero emissions when inverse bonds are activated.

My feeling is that we've, yet again, jumped the gun on this one. In OIP-58 we agreed that we are interested in hiring a market maker to support us on CEXs. Good so far. Now we're deciding between two different proposals each of which proposes to provide liquidity for us using a completely different token. As such, all of the actual terms of the deal get abstracted away and this vote just becomes a proxy for whatever token you prefer to list (or to do nothing at all).

In my opinion the obvious next decision we need to make is to determine whether or not we want to list gOHM or OHM on these exchanges. After we determine that, as a community, then we can issue an RFP for MMs and see a competitive bidding process where we are actually voting on the terms of the deal, not the token.

True ohmies could never vote for #2