TheThorLady

Fulano · Aug 15, 2021

This is a really cool idea, especially insofar as it would open up possibilities for Olympus to function as a majority investing dao, or a holding company dao; a sort of decentralized version of Birkshire Hathaway.

However, the problem is that much of BRK-A's generational wealth accumulation involved being a buyer of last resort, when the markets were tanking. For example they we're able to negotiate the purchase of an incredible amount of Bank of America at prices lower than was available on the market, not to mention preferential shares and all sorts of advantages.

To do that, one needs to buy at moments of peak capitulation.

If you remember a few weeks ago Thorchain was hacked several times. Between the second and third hacks, its price dropped all theway down to 3 dollars. At that very moment, @TheThorLady had been perfecting a proposal to initiate a partnership with Nine Realms, fund a Ohm-Rune liquidity pool, and offer access to Ohm for the btc, xmr, atom, sol blockchains.

However, fears over the dangers of bridge hacks brought the proposal to a halt. It was considered to be too dangerous.

In order to maximally benefit from investing in tokens when they are behaving as distressed assets, timing is everything. I'm not sure the current governance strategy would be sufficiently agile for that. And the overall culture of Olympus dao might not be aligned with buying dips.

Soros said something like "pay close attention when an asset looks like it should go to zero and it doesn't". This worked for Reml in March 2020 and for Ada early 2019.

But how will we correctly time entry points if there is a group consensus vote, and some people are contratians and others are momentum traders?

Another possibility would be to vote continuously on what tokens have the best developer teams, the best project potential, and only pull the trigger when they are down 70-95% from previous ATH.
But that's a VC game, and here I think @Fiskantes would know better than most of us.

Fulano · Jul 18, 2021

@Zeus @TheThorLady @Aigur

As we are debating three potential paths for preparing olympus dao for an interchain future (Thorchain, Terra, and Cosmos), it's important to consider how current members of the board of governors of the Fed are writing about stablecoins.

"The rest of our article is organized as follows: Part I provides the detailed definition of
stablecoins and highlights key market developments over the past few years. It addresses
the fundamental question of, what exactly are stablecoins? Part II begins the historical
review by focusing on money market funds and the trajectory of banking history since they
were deemed to not be deposit-taking institutions. Part III goes back further in time and
describes the Free Banking Era, the consequences of porous regulation, and the eventual
demise of the system via the National Bank Act. Based on these historical lessons, Part IV
presents policies to address the NQA problem and run risk presented by stablecoins. In
general, we observe that the federal government has two sets of options: (1) convert
stablecoins into the equivalent of public money by (a) bringing stablecoins within the insured bank regulatory perimeter or (b) requiring stablecoins to be backed one-for-one with Treasuries or reserves at the central bank; or (2) introduce a central bank digital currency and tax private money out of existence. Table 1 provides a snapshot of the options and whether each option, by itself, could mitigate run risk and achieve NQA."
(Gorton & Zhang, July 17, 2021)

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3888752

If policymakers do choose option 3, 1 rubber-stamped cbdc and regulatory restrictions on others, then this could considerably affect the Olympus treasury. It is wise to future-proof the Ohm treasury against this kind of regulatory attack by building bridges that allow for decentralized assets that are not located in the jurisdiction of the fed.