I really think this is the right step to take considering the cost of $AURA at the moment and the potential benefits this strategic move will bring as regards governance in the balancer ecosystem. Driving third party liquidity to Olympus with the current market condition is a thoughtful move, more so strengthening and boosting POL is even better for the DAO's treasury and I see Aura's protocol design doing just that. I think the best way to see what the possible outcome of this strategic move will be is going through this Dune dashboard (https://dune.com/aura_finance/aura). This is brilliant and I am in support of this proposal.
TAP-17 Aura Acquisition
I'm glad I see some meaningful discussion! After I've read all the comments and resources I think it makes total sense to go with vlAURA option instead of anything else if we have our liquidity on balancer. LFG
I think @LeTube brings good points to the discussion in essence, I am not sure I would agree with his conclusions. IMO the analysis at this moment is whether Aura provides Olympus Treasury the most governance power per $ invested over the lock duration (16 weeks). Analyzing diluted voting power over a multi-year timeframe isn't really relevant for a 4-month lockup.
However, I do agree that if at some point in the future, AURA does not offer the best ratio of Emissions controlled/ $, then it would totally make sense for Olympus Treasury to swap out of its position. Before the end of each lock up period, the position should be reassessed and either relocked or sold for veBAL/other tokens.
Hey Franklin, you raise good points, but maybe I was unclear. Am not saying tomorrow circ. supply of Aura will be 100m. I am saying it is currently in an extreme inflationary phase, issuing 1% of circ supply every week, and therefore if we just think 16 weeks ahead, we forget the fact that we could lose c.16% of our principal investment in this period (assuming flat market cap, which is already bullish since last 30 days price action shows all inflation gets dumped, leading to a 34% decrease in just one month).
Whereas with veBAL or sdBAL, ok, you might have a more expensive price per vote now, but at least in 16 weeks, you didn't lose 16% of your investment (or more).
I think one should view Aura investment just like bribes: you get a better price per vote, but it's an expense, not really an investment, due to the extreme inflationary nature.
This should also answer @balotelli45 's question.
However, I understand that some members of the Olympus team are also members of the Aura team, so I guess it's kinda pointless to argue…
LeTube It is not pointless to argue at all, I definitely appreciate a different perspective and this is the point of having the proposal on the forum vs just on Snapshot. If you are alluding to json in your comment, he is neither a Policy nor Treasury member (nor a contributor in the DAO anymore).
As for your point about dilution, which is of course an important consideration, given the emissions schedule, would Aura still be the best option over the course of the lockup or would that change? If the answer is it would, then we can re-evaluate after every lookup, right?
Using a limited data set (prior 30 days) to project future price is flawed in methodology, both in relation to Aura, which is a yield-bearing asset, and for coins in general. Past performance is no indication of future results--we're not rediscovering an age-old maxim here. Macro factors and crypto-specific fundamental events, like the FTX collapse, are much more likely to be market movers. History suggests that Aura will simply perform in line w/ the market and the remainder of Olympus's portfolio assets going forward. Your investment strategy seems to be a variation on "buying the dip" or "buying distress" which is another common investing fallacy, and especially dangerous in crypto.
However, I would contend that Olympus is not in the trading business at all, so an obsessive focus on price isn't quite necessary. As stated by Wartull, the purpose of this acquisition is to a) drive third party liquidity to Olympus pools, b) incentivize new Olympus liquidity products and partnerships, c) vote for protocol-owned pools and farm rewards, and d) gain governance influence over the Balancer ecosystem. The value of these 4 criteria are not as easily quantified, but of available offerings, Aura remains the only sound choice for DAO accumulation that meets these standards.
Regarding Balotelli's comment, Olympus has an open and transparent treasury and puts together excellent reports on its holdings.
https://app.olympusdao.finance/?_gl=1*1ttujlq*_ga*NDczNzU0MTY1LjE2NzMwMDQ2MTA.*_ga_QV7HNEEHV9*MTY3MzAwNzQ5NS4yLjAuMTY3MzAwNzQ5NS4wLjAuMA..#/dashboard
https://www.olympusdao.finance/transparency?_gl=1*3quctd*_ga*NDczNzU0MTY1LjE2NzMwMDQ2MTA.*_ga_QV7HNEEHV9*MTY3MzAwNDYxMC4xLjEuMTY3MzAwNDYxNi4wLjAuMA..
Thanks for your answer Shadow.
So what am trying to say, and sorry for not doing a good job at it, is that of course, $/vote is important, but you cannot see only that. If you just want to minimise your vote price, you can just bribe veBAL or vlAURA users. But the reason Olympus is considering acquiring AURA is to not have an expense, but more an investment, i.e. to make sure the treasury is not impacted by the governance activity of Olympus. I think it's very good to do so: I would prefer investing over expensing for sure, especially given this kind of returns/price.
However, what I am saying is that for such investment, Aura is not the best tool due to its inflationary nature, as indeed, you will have many votes, but your investment will progressively decrease in value.
Here is a napkin calculation of what I am trying to say:
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/1/d/e/2PACX-1vTRh_Osb7qDXSN_lUZf-QAoAjPjvrEz7YyQzEWwMAOZHWzxM7KAo7OWGz8jKiC43QJpRC1jKh0gDqxu/pubhtml
Basically, on the first 16-week round, Olympus will lose from dilution around $150k on its principal investment. This will allow Olympus to get 142k veBAL votes for 16 weeks. If Olympus was willing to buy those 142k votes for 16 weeks through bribing, it would cost, at the current price of bribes ($0.05/vote.week) $113k, thus saving $37k (plus being flexible).
Therefore, if we are willing to use those $1m as a pocket of money to buy votes, we would be better of doing it via bribes. However, if we want to use those $1m as an investment pocket, we would be better off doing it through veBAL or sdBAL: we would have less voting power in the short term, but the position would be sustainable as it would not structurally decrease at this pace.
Hope you guys see what I am saying…
seems that the decision has already been made 'above the paygrade' its kind of unfortunate to see the decntralised promise go 'this' way …
Maybe a diversified approach using the various solution at our disposal would be a smarter way to do it.
Franklin Using a limited data set (prior 30 days) to project future price is flawed in methodology, both in relation to Aura, which is a yield-bearing asset, and for coins in general. Past performance is no indication of future results--we're not rediscovering an age-old maxim here. Macro factors and crypto-specific fundamental events, like the FTX collapse, are much more likely to be market movers. History suggests that Aura will simply perform in line w/ the market and the remainder of Olympus's portfolio assets going forward. Your investment strategy seems to be a variation on "buying the dip" or "buying distress" which is another common investing fallacy, and especially dangerous in crypto.
However, I would contend that Olympus is not in the trading business at all, so an obsessive focus on price isn't quite necessary. As stated by Wartull, the purpose of this acquisition is to a) drive third party liquidity to Olympus pools, b) incentivize new Olympus liquidity products and partnerships, c) vote for protocol-owned pools and farm rewards, and d) gain governance influence over the Balancer ecosystem. The value of these 4 criteria are not as easily quantified, but of available offerings, Aura remains the only sound choice for DAO accumulation that meets these standards.
I think it's great that you bring a different voice to this discussion, as well as a different perspective. But when you use fuzzy math and nice-sounding investment fallacies to support your contentions, they detract from the strength of your arguments, rather than supplementing them. Here, in your latest spreadsheet, you continue to make the same assumptions regarding 0 veBAL acquisition going forward, no incremental user purchases, and token price directly correlated to it. Currently and historically, that has not been the case.
- Edited
LeTube I think you are being bias as your argument is a bit one-sided and most of your maths is not factual just assumptions with very limited data set. The goal of this proposal was not to decide if the DAO should pay vote incentives to LPs but otherwise, get incentivize both on fees on LP position and voting incentives from third parties, and then ends up with far more governance power in the balancer ecosystem. Here are some of the scenarios we see playing out amongst other things:
Acquire AURA, Lock for vlAURA and get paid voting incentives (instead of the DAO paying out voting incentives too much to incentivize LP because they don't have much governance influence/exposure with the protocol that has better exposure to the most veBAL )
Acquiring AURA, Olympus can direct more liquidity to it pools because its common sense to vote for your own pools, so other LP will want to tag along because of Olympus exposure to greater Governance power.
As stated by Wartull, this is strategic move to expose Olympus to better governance play in the Balancer ecosystem and optimize liquidity, and by standards, Aura is the best tool to use both on a short-term and long-term timeframe.
Besides, the value of any asset in the space is decided by the free market and time not some napkin maths. Risk analysis entails a lot of things, and a full/accurate data set is one of them.
So I did some quick calculations using the same assumptions that @LeTube used in his analysis.
Spreadsheet: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EcZJ06nd6sGbILC0ZraWVNpfr2YNjp0Q3Lbl7UuVTFE/edit?usp=sharing
IMO it is clear that if Olympus wants to go through the ''purchase a token'' route, to maximize the governance power per $ spent over the next year or so, AURA is the token to go. As I mentioned in a previous comment, acquiring AURA today does not mean that Olympus Treasury won't swap out of it, if the metrics are unfavourable in the future.
As for bribes, I agree with @LeTube that they probably are the most efficient way to acquire AURA, under certain circumstances (bribe cost remains low, all/most rewards go to POL etc.)
I think there are two paths to choose from based on this data.
Start a bribe program and evaluate its performance with real data then make a decision on if bribes alone are indeed the most efficient to reach the targeted amount of AURA tokens.
Lower the amount to be purchased(i.e $1M to $0.5M) & acquire the rest of the target through bribes.
The main differentiator is the speed at which the Treasury gains governance power. Option 1 could take multiple weeks/months, while option 2 gives the Treasury a bit more flexibility in that regard.
balotelli45 See! everything still points back to acquiring AURA as the go-to strategy here. Acquiring AURA gives the treasury the required flexibility to achieve Wartull's bullet points for the DAO since that's the goal. This will also benefit the treasury long term and short term. Why pay for Votes when you can own the votes and get paid for them? and even use the votes for your good? IMHO, exposing yourself to 23% of Balancer governance to control fee incentives to POL and also vote Incentives to the treasury is a good game.
- Edited
Thank you everyone for a very good and healthy discussion. Yesterday the Olympus policy team had an extra discussion on the points raised and in summary:
- Olympus has chosen Balancer as the main liquidity hub, and it makes sense to swap into Balancer governance power over Curve
- AURA is short term much more capital efficient than alternatives
- Swapping into AURA will be faster with higher predictability vs bribes
- Bribes are not excluded in the future (see TAP-15)
- The policy team did an internal vote to gauge support, with 4-0 in support of the original proposal
Seeing that the discussion has slowed down, the poll is in favour and most comment writers are still in favour of the proposal it will be posted in its original form to Snapshot now.
Mind that this is just a first step though, so let's keep the discussion going in the Discord. Thank you all again for a productive discussion that will make future proposals better.