OIP-94B Inverse Bond Framework Approval

Suggestion #1: Capacity sizing
Suggest to determine market capacity not in terms of absolutes but rather relatives (or mix of both). Meaning the capacity proposal says like “$1.67m” currently. But there should be a limit such as “max 0.5% of liquid backing to be offered per week”.

Suggestion #2: Dashboard
Suggest to remove the greeting screen on “OHM Backing” on the Olympus Dashboard. This is a depressive greeting. Whether OHM or gOHM – its always gonna be pretty depressive. What IB should help with though is that IB really entices sellers to offload at about 20% premium while advertised as 0.8% discount. This gain for the protocol should be the greeting screen. Meaning a greeting screen such as “Market Value per OHM or gOHM” should trend upwards much easier than “Liquid Backing per OHM”. Thats the essence of IB, and should be visualized as a more optimistic greeting screen; getting peeps to offload at LB/unit while visualizing MV/unit. The larger the true gap between LB (or actually, the effective bond price) and MV the better.

Suggestion #3: Dashboard
If you don’t want to do suggestion #2, then remove the half of LP’s still included in liquid backing. This value drops together with OHM price and puts a depressing slant on the liquid backing value despite IB working to increase total backing/unit.

Suggestion #4: Definitions
Use easily verifiable denominators.
“Floating” supply is a furbished or cooked number. It adds “trust” into the valuation process. Not good. Do not fall for temptation to cook data. Use verifiable total supply. It is what it is.
Same goes for “gOHM supply”, which is a derivative value. Use “OHM supply”.

Do burn and re-mint-- because it cleans up your house – do not just subjectively reclassify it as “out of circulation” when you can anytime bring it back to circulation. Trustless matters.

Suggestion #5: Definitions
Be conservative with the valuation of non-liquid backing assets. And be clear with how the valuation is determined and when/how it is to be revaluated. The “vesting assets” (pKLIMA, pBTRFLY and what not) valuation seems to have been stuck for a while at $32.5m despite the general market tanking.

zachlight16 @bubbidubb @JFry4 any answers?

JFry4

I understand. Is there any reason? There is already a lot of OHM in the treasury that is not used. What is the point of adding more and increasing supply that might be sold later? It makes OHM even less attractive than it is now…

The OHM in the DAO wallet is not the same as Treasury OHM. Repurchased OHM will be held in the Treasury wallet for the protocol to use, whereas the DAO wallet uses OHM mostly for operational expenses.

bubbidubb Thanks for the suggestions as always. Can you expand on the capacity sizing one? The current model does use relative metrics (% below backing) to determine capacity.

bubbidubb

Speaking to Suggestion #2 - There's alignment on this internally as well. Working on adjustments in support of this in a future release of the dashboard. RBS is will largely be the focus but there's a general restructuring happening so we'll be adjust metrics accordingly.

Thanks for the suggestion!

abipup

I come from the corner where Preservation of Capital is paramount. Hence I would like to see that the burn rate of Liquid Backing follows a curve similar to the look of:
f(x) = 1 / x
where f(x) represents dollar amount of Liquid Backing remaining in Treasury and x represents time
rather than the proposed capacity sizing that seems to follow the linear type of curve such as
f(x) = a - b*x

The proposed capacity sizing seems to enable Liquid Backing to linearly hit 0? Game over.
A 1/x type of curve should ensure there will always be at least some Liquid Backing left.

So far we have spent (my understanding) $54m on price propping through IB. 54m USD corresponds to 540 man years of highly skilled 1st world engineering labor. We still have about 2,000 man years remaining in Treasury to reach the vision of a decentralized reserve currency.

abipup

Replied, but the post is stuck in "Awaiting approval"

electo I tend to disagree about making this two OIP's; it's the "final" framework before RBS and I think it should pass or fail as a whole.

Not sure how successful that attack vector could be. Bots would need to buy their OHM back eventually in this case, so the fees they'd pay on that would need to be offset both ways. Inverse bond discounts have been routinely below 0.6% so it would not be profitable even if they could manage this logistically.

abipup

The purpose of safeguarding reserves would be to secure project longevity, and to maintain/build market confidence in the project and its valuation. This project is very experimental, and an ambitious vision such as creating the world's decentralized reserve currency is going to take a lot more than 2 years from today. The experimentation, iteration, innovation and engineering required to reach the vision will require a tons of funding. Reserves = funding.

Also, at the extreme sad end of it, wouldn't there just be:
1 last OHM left,
0 liquid backing left
32.5M worth of vested assets
Might be a good deal for the OHM owner, assuming ofc that the vested assets really are worth 32.5M and transferrable?

Fun picture: US Treasury seems to have been running Inverse Bonds on their gold between 1960-1970 until they realized its not going to end well and said to hell with our commitment; nobody is gonna claim no more of our reserves.

Price keeps falling. I am not sure if the actions taken are good enough. So please evaluate your proposals with this point in mind. If it requires taking a step back and revsiting we should consider it.