xh3b4sd

  • Jan 24, 2022
  • Joined Apr 16, 2021
  • I am completely against anything Wonderland/TIME related until initial promises are not kept. 33% of Wonderland treasury for Olympus was a handshake deal agreed on by Dani. Before this is not settled no further steps should be taken.

  • Thank you for the proposal. I made a little risk analysis of the Gro protocol and was concerned for various reasons that may be debatable. My suggestion was to start with 100k and to my surprise I find this proposal to suggest 500k investment. I personally find this too high and would have appreciated to be kept in the loop upfront. Therefore I am voting against this now, because I think the amount of funds is too big for this particular partnership at this particular point in time.

    • I appreciate the proposal and the idea to make our liquidity more capital efficient. I would just think that fragmenting our liquidity by only moving 50% to Arbitrum doesn't make much sense, because the other half will remain useless. So I would rather vote to move everything we have to V3 or Trident and if it makes sense have all of it on Arbitrum.

    • Stratoshi_Styles hey fren, I feel like you are off on a multitude of points but let me provide my point of view for what it's worth.

      1. You are not the first raising concerns about comp, which is why this proposal got launched. There were very critical members in the DAO server before you and all of them made us better along the way. In that light you are a very valuable contributor to the DAO as well. Nobody wants an echo chamber and we surely do not intend to fill our own pockets just because.
      2. Everyone who wants to contribute and gets after it will find work and will get compensated relative to efforts of the other DAO members. There are no ranks and no hidden benefits for privileged individuals. Never has been. Never will be. I am personally one of the people who will make sure that this particular fairness will prevail because in that regard you and I may be very similar. The way it works is that every door is open. All that matters is "proof of work" in the DAO. The reason for OG members is because these people show up every single day, for months. And so anyone has the same chances to become an OG as well if they put in the hours like anyone else in fact does. The only barrier of entry within the DAO is the individual decision to show up and get shit done.
      3. Towards transparency, reading your message it seems you did not see the link to the google sheet tracking all expenses and allocations. Once again for you, please see our google sheet. A lot of what happens is being made transparent. If you feel like this is not good enough you are welcome to join the DAO and get your own hands dirty so that we together become better again.
      4. Now what engineering does. A lot happens in Github. See https://github.com/OlympusDAO. 29 engineers are at least visible but these are not all and not all work all the time equally. Usually you have to account for 150k per engineer per year. And then this is only engineering without product managers, designers, scrum masters, you name it. Some repos are even private in Github, for reasons. So for once there are integrations and data solutions that have to be worked on in the backend and in the frontend. One of these integrations is with Pool Together which will launch the next weeks. And so this is only one of our initiatives. These kind of integrations are all about smart contract engineering and UI/website changes. Data solutions include things like The Graph nodes which are required to work with relevant data in the frontends. And then we have the Dune Dashboards the community and e.g. the policy team uses heavily on a daily basis. Just mentioning the data teams here since this is similar engineering effort in my head. Then, you may have noticed that our frontends continuously get better. The reason is people work on it all the time. Oh and let's not forget anything related to security audits for our contracts where auditing firms and whitehats help us deliver bullet proof technology. Further, we have Olympus Pro in the works which requires similar engineering and security efforts in the frontend and backend alone for engineering. There are also reasons why certain business intelligence is kept private until launch. Everyone has the same problem, technology is expensive to operate fren and its complexity has to be mastered. I spare you more details in here but please hit me up in Discord to go over more if you want to.
      5. We are so early it is unbelievable. Anyone can still become an OG themselves and acquire massive voting power if they want to. The thing is just that most people have their own plans and we often see how individuals move on to chase another pump. Just like you proclaimed to take profit and sell your own skin in the game and voting power. I mean, more power to you fren. Just, in my eyes you sell the future and the world of us versus them you create for yourself is not the world I want to live in. DeFi is an open ecosystem that provides equal participation. All it takes is the individual decision. Therefore I think it is not fair to argue against the people who have massively skin in the game, because they earn it. The point being, anyone can earn the same. It is only the difference of the point in time at which every individual may start out.
      6. The APY was not nuked twice a month. OIP-11 launched in June, knowing this was just the beginning of our transformation. OIP-18 finally launched in August with a framework so that everyone knows what direction we go. This transparency was especially important to me personally. We will continue to adjust the system and at least the future of our reward rate should be a bit more certain by now.

      Hope that provides a bit of perspective to the conversation. Anyone wanting to talk more about specific things feel free to reach out any time. I love all my ohmies.

    • I do not have enough information to make an informed decision on the poll. Which is why it would have been cool to engage within the DAO before posting this here. If you want to push this please let's engage in Discord first.

    • Hey fren, thank you for your contribution. Please note that I am no expert on Cosmos nor ATOM and I very much appreciate the efforts around the IBC protocol. So if my assumptions here are off, by any means, please call me out for it. It would have been cool to have conversations within the DAO together prior to posting here. The thing is, what you propose is technically not easily doable right now. For the same reasons as I was against the ThorChain idea I am against ATOM as a treasury asset. The solutions we have right now are technologically immature relative to what we need for treasury assets. There doesn't even exist a wrapped ERC20 version of ATOM as far as I can tell. So there is nothing the treasury could accumulate in a trustless way. Given these assumptions I would like to point out that our main objective is to build trustless and permissionless systems. Making Zeus buy ATOM on a CEX will certainly not help us in the future.

      • I did not support this proposal in the first place, for several reasons outlined earlier. Since the proposal got drafted we witnessed two hacks on ThorChain costing a lot of people a lot of money. I think this here needs more time and thought to get right. Happy to learn more and move forward in a constructive basis.

        • In the spirit of the DAO I have no motivation fighting against this proposal. If the group brain thinks this is the right move then a vote will surely foster this sentiment. I do not know everything and I am not always right, which is why everyone of us relies on our fellow ohmies to hold the line. Together we are better off and make better decisions. I can only share opinions about what I see and understand. I am happy to be wrong with this one and I am happy to see numbers down the road about how many people find their new hohme coming from other chains if this goes through.

        • TLDR

          • expensive marketing stunt
          • horrible wallet UX
          • custodial pool solution
          • no automation
          • no bonding

          I certainly appreciate the effort put into this proposal and love to see different communities to collaborate. Over the past weeks I tried to better understand how ThorChain and OlympusDAO could collaborate in a meaningful way. So far nobody could really outline strategic benefits of the suggested RUNE pool on ThorChain. I understand this is all very early for ThorChain but all this pseudo custodial multisig setup is broken by design in a trustless ecosystem. It does make zero sense that there is no automated integration. The lack of automation and integration is then also why this proposal does not include our usual bonding mechanism which means that we create a completely new avenue of which I am not convinced we should do that because I do not see why. As it seems to me this collaboration at this point would not be more than a very expensive marketing stunt. I am happy to learn more about what I couldn't learn already during the past weeks, so somebody tell me please why we should do this at all. Further, multisigs managing 7+ figures should at least be 3 of 5. And then this XDEFI wallet thing sounds horrible TBH. Like why would you do this to your users. I am not sure how big the audience of LTC hodlers is who are not able to find their way to Ethereum mainnet and if it is really worth our DAO funds to go after them. I think it is way too early for this kind of thing to play out so I would vote to defer.

          • Agree to defer. What I also do not like is the asymmetry in incentives each party has to bring to the table. We pay way more and I do not see what particular benefit we get out of that asymmetry other than being strategically exploited as the weak counterpart. It is not so much about the value of money but how a partnership should be bootstrapped. If we roll together we should be aligned and equal to some extend.

            • A warmup period is a good tool to prevent unintended behaviour. Some thoughts from my side, also based on community brain playing out in the responses.

              • I do not follow why that extra transaction is necessary. As I see it an implementation would be possible without that constraint. I would like to hear the technical reason for this decision since I feel like I am missing something. /cc @Zeus
              • Having longer warm up periods punishes ohmies who help fill the treasury. IMO we want to encourage (4, 4), that is (1, 1) to (3, 3). A single epoch warmup period should be good enough to start with.
              • My understanding is a bit incomplete about multiple stakes. Say I have multiple bonds vesting and stake vested bond rewards multiple times per day or at least daily. Is the warmup period reset every time I stake anew? Is it only "warmed up" once and then I stake however I like? Does unstaking reset the warmup period? And if so do I need to execute that claim transaction every time over and over again? Maybe a more detailed description of a real world scenario would help my understanding to make an informed decision. If the UX is impacted drastically I would rather vote for no warmup period at all because the cost on the individual would be too high to impose for to me unclear benefits or problems we try to solve right now. /cc @Zeus
              • I like the idea of integrating with Aave to foster our strategic partnership moving forward. Re allocation I think we should start small. Reason being we can always scale up if we want to. Considering the other way around would be odd. Say we bet big from the start and then figure out we want to allocate differently. Pulling liquidity is always a bad move for partners. Whereas scaling into it is much more reliable and promising. I think we should not do more than 10% at a time so that we can have a look at the situation. We can come back and re-evaluate. This is the most prudent thing to do from a policy perspective IMO.

                Edit: thank you so much Tex for bringing up the proposal and rooting for the Aave partnership.

                • I thought we could start making the DAO funds productive. Though the math does not fully check out to cover all remunerations right now. Regardless we could maybe start digging into this topic somehow.

                • In order to vote on locked staking there have to be certain implementation details hashed out first. The team is working on it. The next step we want to take is to share a spreadsheet that people can play around with. That sheet will provide more insights in how the reward mechanism for the different locking terms may look like. I hope this sheet will be sharable in the next days.

                • I want to thank everyone who engaged in here, on Discord and on Twitter. The proposal IMO was already a huge success because it achieved what it intended to do. We planted the seeds for the future. The overwhelming majority of feedback about realizing the price floor as tool for monetary policy was constructive and positive. A lot of amazing debates got initiated already and I think ideas for future plans got bolstered.

                  Raising the price floor implies reducing runway as of now. I have hoped to have made this very clear in the proposal above. Following some conversations I was not always sure if all consequences of this tool were fully understood. The proposal does not mean to make us raise the price floor right now just like that. That would never work out for the system. I think what is most important is to tune the engine, the protocol, and beef up the treasury, so that we maintain a healthy backing above price floor. Over time I would like to make the treasury more productive and maybe set aside access reserves that can be particularly used for only increasing the backing without diluting runway. But that is deep down into the future, because all of these developments take a lot of time.

                  We are now way more clear on reducing APY to stop bleeding rewards and to increase sustainability for the protocol. Because right now our backing is effectively diluted every day. So we are totally moving into the right direction with e.g. OIP-9 and everything else we do right now. See partnerships and pool bootstrapping.

                  I think changing quantities or divisibility of OHM is a separate subject and I did not intent to suggest anything like having to deal with smaller units of a token. I personally do not understand the problem domain of unit bias here. So I would leave that to another proposal and to people who are more into that topic than me.

                • cabanaboy1977 we need 100% slashing of rewards if you break the contract that you agreed on in the first place. Think about the game theory here. We need it. It is good. You are not sure if 1 year locking is right for you? Good, then do not lock for 1 year. And now somebody else has a different strategy and preference and they will lock for 1 month, or 6 months, or 1 year. And because of the strict rules we spread vesting periods which will help get the locking into a smooth rhythm. That means we prevent this big single dump after 1 year that everyone is afraid off. Also when somebody breaks the rules, their forfeited rewards remain within the distributor contract from which it is given to the real ohmies. That sounds good to me.

                  • A lot of people brought up very good feedback and ideas. I am trying to provide my own two cents where I see fit and hope to clarify the situation a bit.

                    • rotorless brought up the lack of a problem statement. I agree with that. The OIP is not well structured to lay out reasons for the proposed change. You would need to read up everywhere in order to understand how we ended up here. The problem as I understand it is that the protocol bleeds way too much rewards. This is an energy leak as described in my proposal to realize the price floor as tool for monetary policy. We give away more rewards than we grow the protocol right now. As such our backing decays at a fast rate. We want to fix this so that we can maintain a higher backing in a more sustainable way. And the reason we want this is to maybe, just maybe, be able to buy back below backing eventually. See my proposal. No alfa leak here. Move on Ser. Now, in order to stop the protocol bleeding rewards too much we need to reduce rewards and cap them. One idea was for people to get "fewer" rewards they could expect a higher price per unit if we remove circulating supply from the market. New reward structure and locking therefore go hand in hand.
                    • badgerpawz brought up supply shock issues that could potentially occur. I second these concerns. To address these issues there can be used all kinds of mechanisms and we should seriously consider them. Two ideas I find most compelling to address supply shocks would be as follows. First, let's not cap it to 1 year. Let people lock for 5 years if they want. If we want to not increase multipliers from the 12th month of locking people could remain locked with their 12 month multiplier until their individual term ends, e.g. after 5 years. Second, linear vesting after 50% or 75% of locking period. So if you lock for 1 year you may start to take out rewards after month 9 but only to a limited degree of e.g. 20% of your full rewards spread over 3 months. I think these kind of mechanisms would greatly help even out supply shock scenarios. On an ending note, in worst case there would likely be only one supply shock scenario, which would be when the majority of locked allocations ended the very first time after introduction of the locked stacking mechanism. Because after the first round of vested majority the system would run way more smoothly since people come in every day. We naturally spread over time.
                    • Graz brought up locked stakes to be used as collateral. I suggested this to Zeus and he agreed we could do this in the future. The idea here would be that since Olympus has your stake, it might as well give you a DAI loan on it. So you could realize yield on your future rewards right now against your locked stake. I am not saying we will do it like that. I just want to put emphasis on the need of making your collateral in form of a locked stake productive. I am very big on this and will try to push in this direction in the future. And I believe we can come up with a reasonable solution for it eventually.
                    • Baitfish brought up strategic issues around our goal of being a currency. Let's say we say we want OHM to become a currency. That does not mean that OHM will be a currency from day one. Anything that aims to be a currency needs to go through a long process of bootstrapping. Traditionally these processes took generations of time. I do not see how locked staking is against our end goal. Most concerns brought up around this proposal are rather concerned with short term effects. If our hypothesis holds true that locked staking paves the way for our future success we are more likely to make OHM a currency, if this is what you want. Olympus is not about a typical trading cycle. Never has been.
                  • Thank you so much for your proposal. I think the reason why we use DAI for backing OHM in the first place and not some USD derivative is because we want to free us from the centralization risk of e.g. the US Government's money printing. Now banking on sUSD would be backwards and we would start to get more bound to the US Dollar. Even if certain liquidity and revenue streams provide short term profit, we should ask ourselves more what we want to bank on in the future and what is it that helps us and DeFi flourish without having to fear to be shut down by external actors. So IMO anything fiat related is not an option for us. If there is an DeFi index and itself is decentralized we may want to consider such an asset in the future.

                    • tex replied to this.
                    • I like the idea and think we should partner. Just for clarification how this would work in more depth below a couple of questions.

                      • The proposal mentions "The pool would be bootstrapped via dual-incentived LP-staking hosted by FRAX.". Does that mean FRAX pays for everything or where is the OHM in that pool coming from?
                      • How big will the initial pool be?
                      • We go with Uniswap V2 or V3? If we go with V3 how is that managed since we can chose liquidity curves?
                      • Do we already have an idea about the bond parameters in that pool?
                      • Since we acquire parts of FRAX LP for our own reserve, what amount of RFV would we consider reasonable?