- Edited
This proposal is interesting, but to truly be viable, it should be accompanied by a scheme for eventually selling ETH for stable assets to raise the RFV of the treasury. If the OP intends for ETH to never to be sold, then ETH bonding can only drive RFV/OHM down and there's no upside to it from an OHM holder's/appraiser's POV. Arguments about the increase in IV are meaningless if the non-stables are never sold. If the OP does intend for ETH to be sold at some point, then a concrete plan for selling non-stables should accompany this proposal.
Ideally, such a plan would limit the value of the non-stables held to a small fraction of the protocol's RFV. That's because a proper appraisal of the risk reward ratio of OHM becomes difficult when the value of the non-stable assets is of the same or greater order as the the treasury's RFV. One would need to become an expert on all the non-stable assets in the treasury to do a proper appraisal of this ratio. Compare this with the simplicity of the present, where all that's needed is knowledge of the RFV, the runway at the current reward rate, and an understanding of the prevailing appetite for risk. Such simplicity is highly desirable and a crown jewel of the protocol. A legitimate case for forking OHM to maintain this simplicity could be made were it to disappear. I’d hate to see that happen.
Whatever plan to sell non-stables for stables gets hatched out should also apply to any non-stable rewards in the treasury (e.g. Sushi). I don't see the point of accumulating such non-stable assets if the protocol never intends to sell them to raise the RFV.
At any rate, July 27th is too early for a scattershot vote on this, IMO. Too many outstanding questions that require careful deliberation.