kleb

  • 31 Mar
  • Joined Aug 26, 2021
  • I would echo @hodlmao above. 75%/25% stable/volatile is too conservative imo. Possible framework:

    1. The community adopts the position that stables are kept solely for the purpose of supporting the lower cushion of RBS. If there are other use cases for stables the community likes these could be factored in.

    2. Using historical data on the cost of IBs, we estimate how much it would cost to maintain the lower cushion for a year + some insane error term. For example; imagine IBs cost $2M for the past year (idk the actual number). Plus a 5,000% margin for error means we need $100M stables in the treasury. The different parameters can be modelled for the community to evaluate and vote on.

    3. When reserve bonds are turned back on, they are only on for stable assets until we reach that threshold of $200M. After that its purely ETH, wBTC and whatever strategic assets we may want (CVX, BAL etc)

    I like this framework because it links treasury management to RBS, its programmable but with room for DAO discretion, its data driven and it provides forward guidance for the market. It would make OHM backing more volatile. Worth it imo. I personally think no stable asset is gonna be big enough AND decentralized enough until OHM gets biig.

    The question then is what stables to hold. There's not many suitable options out there but we do have room to increase LUSD exposure. What's the most of their mcap we can hold without being seen as a risk by the liquity team?

  • Voting option 1.

    The last OIP we had on staking indicated we're moving towards a bond centric future. Lets stick to that and really commit. Staking rate to 0, bond markets full force.

  • Great to see the evolution of council and this seems like a logical set of procedural steps to sort out.

    What would happen in this scenario:

    • Community passes a vote of no confidence. As far as I understand this does not stipulate any lack of confidence in specific members of the council, but the council in general. Presumably this means existing council members can put themselves back up for vote.
    • Election process begins, some or all existing council members put themselves back up for vote.
    • DAO votes and all or part of the original council is reinstated.
    • The election process has been followed as outlined but if the community is unsatisfied with the largely (or completely) unchanged council, it doesn't get to express this formally for another year.

    This outcome could be avoided with specific votes of no-confidence for each council member. Only those seats would be up for re-election within the DAO, and of course those members who lost the no confidence vote would not be allowed to run.

    The alternative is that a no-confidence vote in the council means a complete change in the council. This seems like a risky and suboptimal route.

    On the point that @pottedmeat raises above about our knowledge of specific council members contributions I largely agree but I think this is solved through each council members areas of accountability. In the initial council proposal each member had a role description and areas of responsibility. So perhaps the community could use these to gauge council members effectiveness. E.G if community management efforts seem shoddy to me, I might give a no-confidence vote to Wartull. (I don't actually think this btw, just an example!)

  • Great proposal. The deal between Incubator and Vendor fell through because of changes in the DAO and Incubator team specifically. The team and product at Vendor were viewed in a very favourable light by the Incubator team at the time.

    I would personally love to see this proposal pass. $500K is a reasonable initial allocation.

    • Is there a difference between the upcoming credit markets mentioned here and OHM bonds?

    • Love the idea and agree with @cpt_zeke that it seems logical this goes through the grants process.

      Will the content be free for users?

      • If I understand correctly the aim here is to get a vote of confidence from the Olympus community and DAO as this will help econohmic labs raise its seed round. If that's correct it might be good to treat this introduction to the community like you would treat your first reach out to an investor:

        - Show us a pitch deck detailing traction, problem/solution, roadmap etc
        - Tell us who you are (just discord username would suffice)
        - Tell us why you are the team for doing this

        I understand you arnt asking for an investment of money but you are asking for public alignment so I personally think you need to show a bit more to get folks excited and backing your vision.

      • Appreciate the responses tex

        How is Olympus able to hold equity in a company?

        How does holding equity support our ambitions to be a reserve currency?

        How do OHM holders realise any benefit from equity ownership? With tokens it's easy: each token backs the value of OHM, verifiable on chain. This is not the case with equity.

        Afaik there has been no public comms about Olympus holding shares and/or having shareholders. What's the rationale here and at what stage does the community gain visibility or get a say in this structure?

      • My questions from the RFC have so far gone unanswered so will repeat then here:

        1. Will the tokens accrued through OP that sit in the Olympus treasury remain, or be transferred to the new OP ms?

        2. You mention Olympus retaining ownership and gov rights in Bond Protocol, can you share more about how this will work? Through a token?

        3. Will there be any sort of revenue share between Bond Protocol and Olympus?

        4. Do you see foresee bonds protocol offering OHM bonds itself in the future? Or is the idea more to be a piece of infra that other teams can utilize?


          If some of my q's are legally/strategically sensitive and cant all be answered that's fine. But the main spirit of what im getting at is how specifically will Olympus retain a stake in OPs success and strategic direction.

      • I think building a currency that people trust is as much a psychological endeavour as it is a financial one. On a financial level turning off APY when revenue is zero makes sense. But on a psychological level turning off APY means we stop rewarding holders for withholding supply from the market and doing this at seemingly arbitrary moments is harmful to confidence imo.

        BTC has never turned off its supply expansion. It adjusts based on pre-determined conditions like the halving and miner difficulty. We should take inspiration from this.

        I would be in favour of a framework that adjusts reward rate based on more variables than just supply like including revenue for instance. I know this has been rumoured for a while. Personally I think that kind of forward guidance is more beneficial than a sudden drop to zero APY.

        • z_33 replied to this.
        • It's a shame to see such a successful arm of Olympus spinning out on its own, but the logic laid out in this proposal makes sense. Couple of questions:

          1. Will the tokens accrued through OP that sit in the Olympus treasury remain, or be transferred to the new OP ms?
          2. You mention Olympus retaining ownership and gov rights in Bond Protocol, can you share more about how this will work? Through a token?
          3. Will there be any sort of revenue share between Bond Protocol and Olympus?
          4. Do you see foresee bonds protocol offering OHM bonds itself in the future? Or is the idea more to be a piece of infra that other teams can utilise?
        • Very much in favour of a bonus framework and I think the simple goals are clear and easy to measure. Can you clarify what is meant by sliding scale? E.G if we are 10% over premium on 12/31/22, will 50% of a bonus be paid?

          Measurable goals are one half of a good bonus structure but the other half is working out who should get said bonus. Is it the case that if goals are met ALL DAO members get paid a bonus?

          We're reliant on leaders measuring the value of contributors, but who is measuring the value added by council members? From a community perspective we have very little insight in to who is doing what. It's feasible that one council member adds little whilst another makes a big impact. DAO members will have much better insight in to this, would the council be open to their bonuses being voted on (individually) by DAO members before being awarded?

          • For a DAO to peacefully decentralise control of its operations away from its founding team is no easy feat. I think it takes time and considered thought and both these things are apparent in this RFC.
            Thank you to the folks who are stepping in to leadership roles, and to tex for putting the proposal together. Excited to see what we achieve in 2022!

          • Kition my reservations are:

            • Building blockchains is hard. Most fail to attract significant volume and users. Novel consensus mechanisms are interesting but higher risk. My preference is to let the market decide who the winners are and for Olympus to commit capital and resources higher up the tech stack.

            • 500K is a substantial investment at this time particularly given we are essentially investing in an idea and a team.

              I am a contributor in the incubator team. I raised my thoughts in internal conversations. The actual assessment of this proposal and interactions with the berachain team as been managed by the partnerships team in the DAO. I did not feel the need to raise my reservations publicly, as I feel like I have been heard within the DAO and though I am still not personally convinced, I do have faith in the diligence of my fellow contributors. Its up to the community to now decide.

            • With bonding in to concentrated pools, would the bonder see any difference on the front end? Or do they just bond as normal and the LP is allocated to pools at the discretion of policy?
              Is the makeup of concentrated pools something the policy team will openly share?
              Concentrated liq pools feels like something that was literally made for Olympus to utilise. Has there been collaboration with uniswap on building their v3?

              Just want to say bravo. The prospect of Olympus more actively impacting OHM markets is huge.

              • I certainly approve of buying assets at a discount. As has been suggested previously marking the tender price as a % reduction from backing would be preferable given price volatility.

                The fact that no terms are attached to the developer grant points to it being an incentive for the devs to ensure the deal goes through. I'm not against paying a price if we still come out with discounted assets, but I think Olympus should be more targeted and transparent here and actually state what it wants.

                From my understanding: we want to persuade the devs who a) have skills we want in Olympus and b) control the treasury of the protocol. So lets put a list together of who they are and make them an offer.

                Using language like 'developer grant' and 'tender offer' is very nice and 3,3 but lets be real. This is a takeover. We need to persuade key players to cooperate. If ohmies view the grant as a price to gain substantial discounted assets, I think there will much less resistance. Then its up to SPA devs + holders whether they want to do it.

              • great solution to the problem of maintaining governance rights whilst simultaneously holding the most liquid OHM token. Fiat DAO is an ideal partner for this, as they have demonstrated long-term alignment with our community.

              • Seems like a common sense update to the program.

              • Yella Interesting. Your initial post gave me the impression you viewed the community as having too much power vs the DAO. This I disagree with but I do see the merits in exploring governance options.

                Perhaps this could exist as a working group within one of the existing departments in the DAO? I'll tag the operations team in discord to give this post a read and offer some comments.

                • I would argue there are already multiple areas where the community has delegated decision making responsibility to the DAO. Treasury management, Olympus pro partnerships and incubator partnerships to name a few. I think this demonstrates that the community recognises the time and energy required to make informed decisions and is happy to delegate that responsibility to dedicated ohmies in the DAO.

                  The recent vote in favour of reward rate drop also demonstrates ohmies value long-term health over short term gain. I don't believe ohmies would have voted for this if they weren't aligned with the views of the DAO - particularly the policy team in this case.

                  For that reason I don't think there is an urgent need to reform our governance and so I dont think the DAO should be funding a gov working group.

                  That said, I agree there is value in keeping track of governance practises and we should be open to change if needs be, I just don't think we are there now.