Dudemyguy

With alchemist model, people can just capitulate the minute they get all emotional..... whereas with locking emotional capitulation is greatly reduced"

I think you're spot on with this and I'm personally excited for a 'set it and forget it' approach with a promising project like Ohm. If I'm locked in for 6 or 9 months, then I'm not checking the price all the time or debating what move I should make, selling one thing for another but losing more in gas fees than anything.

When FUD overload occurs during bear periods, we've all made dumb moves where you sell something you actually believe in for just a slight profit (or loss), but then aren't able to buy back in at a good price because of FUD, FUD, FUD. Then before you know it the market takes back off, and there you sit feeling like the weakest, smooth-brained, tissue-handed ape to ever bang on a keyboard.

So, there's 2 big attractions/rationales here I think everyone should consider:

  1. As Dudemyguy said "with locking, emotional capitulation is greatly reduced" - This is potentially HUGE... for stability of Ohm price, stability of community and success of long-term project objectives

  2. Maybe more importantly, @Zeus has said "Bet big on projects and people you believe in" We have a mechanism to do that here with longer term locked stakes. Betting big means a chance for big rewards, but never without risk.

Now we could wait for some perfect window, macro/micro tweak the proposals to death trying to idiot-proof the staking process, but I don't think that would be good for the protocol, and it doesn't enable those of us who believe to Bet Big.

Summing up, I think the common sense of it is:
  • Utilize multiple lock up lengths to distribute your risk exposure
  • You can always just unstake your principal if shit hits the fan in life
  • A contract is a contract is a contract (let's not build in paper-hand clauses)
  • Where there's a path to weaken FUD powers and strengthen 3,3, let's take it!!

    Chochy I feel locked staking is a very bad idea. And it is a turn off for me, it makes the project seem far less attractive, and yes it seems it will pass in scattershot, because those with most votes are always in the minority when it comes to scattershot - there is nothing democratic about it. There should be two votes, the standard scattershot vote, and another vote for those who just hold sOHM - but each vote has equal weight regardless of how many you hold, I could imagine quite often there would be a dichotomy between the votes, since one is a corporate style shareholder vote and the other is a democratic one. Disappointed it is going this way, it was not what attracted me to the protocol, and this changes it into a completely different beast. The beauty of OHM for me, was that each OHM is backed by 1 DAI, and look at the price of BTC that has infinitely less backing. Locked staking makes it very unattractive to newcomers, and they are required for capital inflow and without that the project is dead no matter how ingenious you are with lock up periods. Locked staking is, in its emotional content: Lets protect what we have because we are fearful; Rather than a feeling of optimism and growth.

      Zeus You can unlock before the end of your term, but you forfeit everything you have earned

      Just wanted to Clarify. When you say 'everything' you do mean the normal rebase as well? So if you staked 10 ohm for 1 year and unstake at 11 months. you would only get your 10 Ohm back? Or do you get your 10 + the normal rebases?

      I still think you should get something more since you did stake for a long period of time (something on a sliding scale and not the full amount because you didn't fulfill your commitment), but if you are at least getting the normal rebases then it isn't as bad as I thought.

      • Graz replied to this.

          cabanaboy1977 well that has been my argument all along, A "scaling reward period" based system. You receive an incremental increase of a multiplier the longer you stake. When you claim any reward or unstake, the multiplier is lost. Since you have to wait a considerable time for the multiplier to increase, losing it is a large disincentive to unstake/claim. I think this would tip the balance enough the achieve longer term staking, while keeping the protocol attractive for new and old investors. Instead of the punitive model currently proposed....

            I think this an important step forward in maintaining the health of the protocol on a broader timeline. I think everyone has had enough time to understand the initial mechanisms. Where speculation has been healthy in battle testing the mechanisms there comes a time to prioritise the protocols longevity. That time has definitely come!

            LFG, super excited for this implementation.

            P.S
            How were the boosts calculated and what makes it really difficult to implement these calculations on-chain? Is it code related or gas related?

            Just wondering, as it seems locked staking is inevitable, even though I am against it. Will the bonding discount be attractive? The unlocked staking reward will be low - so where will the bond discount sit? Higher than unlocked stake, but less than 1 month locked stake? It can't be any other way, as there will be no incentive to "lock", but then this restricts the range to make bonding attractive. Reward scaling solves the problem, sorry for harping over and over about this.

            Would the lockup be transferrable? Say someone locks up for 12 months but needs the cash, could they sell the rights for a discount on a secondary market? If possible, I think this would also open up to longer term locks (years). Also, could become tradable long term asset class. A great opportunity to lock up sizable amounts of other platform treasury assets. Bond directly into long term lock.

              Mongo this would be big brain moves. There's a big advantage to doing this from the protocol's point of view, as the person buying would be crazy to unlock early, since they theoretically paid more than the base OHM amount.

              I'd like to see how this could be possible to implement.

              • Graz replied to this.

                  Mongo Well, I have mentioned this before, the solution lies with how https://crucible.alchemist.wtf/ is implemented. Each stake is contained within a NFT and the NFT is transferable and therefore can be sold, yet the investment is not unstaked, but still tied to the NFT. However I don't think the OHM team have this in mind.

                  The other great thing about the https://crucible.alchemist.wtf/ system is the Reward Scaling, but that does not answer your question.

                    Dudemyguy the dumb money may prefer Reward scaling over time, rather than locking, after all dumb money is what will grow the protocol. As for "Jarring" so as you imply by this, you understand Locking is a punitive measure, so how is this going to attract new money? Dumb money asks, what price was your entry $4?

                    The dumb money, may have bought with the expectation that each OHM was backed by 1 DAI and would expect that over time the price may approach $1, but the runway/apy/bonding was algorithmically adjusted to ensure the protocol stayed solvent, as that was how it was presented. But Obviously the dumb money was not privy to unpredictable changes or the desires of the large bag holders who represent the minority with the majority of votes in scattershot.

                    Reward scaling achieves all of the desired outcomes without the "Jarring" factor. So, since we are in the "trial and error phase", why not allow both reward scaling and locking to be implemented simultaneously? And see which one is most beneficial to the protocol? Then after the "Trial" axe the least beneficial, if necessary.

                      Zeus 1 year locks for all the Ohmies! LFG!!

                        bluesinsoul Just a note on Alchemist vs OHM:
                        Alchemist's reward is based on different algorithms:
                        a. $MIST inflates by 1% every fourteen days, these minted MIST are is distributed to $MIST/LP token providers that have bonded their LP tokens to their NFT (crucible Aludel rewards) based on the reward Multiplier that reaches 10x after 60days. As follows:
                        50% to Aludel reward pool, 25% to $MIST community multisig & 25% to $MIST treasury
                        b. Since the release of mistx.io flashbots dex - some of the fees are rewarded to the crucible holders.

                        This is different to how OHM works, OHM inflation is based on bonding, not an arbitrary 1% like $MIST and the only relevant part is Reward Scaling:
                        If you unstake/claim, you lose your reward multiplier, so there is a large disincentive to unstake. The reward multiplier takes some time to reach maximum, and this could be any period or multiplier.

                        This achieves the same result as Locking but with more flexibility and without the punitive measure of losing "all rewards".

                        AS a side:
                        If OHM implements an NFT similar to Alchemist - then your position could be transferred or sold. And if Locked staking was to go ahead, being able to sell your position would be a compromise since it is locked. So you could sacrifice mobility but provide value and some fungibility at the same time.. I am against locked staking, but if it was implemented this way it would be more palatable.

                            Think this is very solid, and would be happy to see it implemented.

                            Generally in support, at least for the short term. I was thinking we could add the following to the locked staking:

                            After locking sOhms, the DAO (and only the DAO) can change the address to which these tokens will go at the end of the lockup period. This would be useful in at least two scenarios:

                            • If an ohmie's wallet gets hacked, he can prove that he's an ohmie and that he has the private key to his address, doxx himself or whatever (burden of proof is on him), the DAO could vote to send it to his new address. The DAO could keep a very small fee or whatever.
                            • When remunerating people working for the DAO, we could remunerate them with locked tokens by locking it and then changing the receiving address. The exact remuneration locking period parameters are out of the scope here, but it's just a free option that we could have (like remunerating half/half locked token, or some linear vesting with 20% locked 1 month, 20% locked 2 months etc.)
                            • _mp_ replied to this.

                              Graz Thanks for the explanation. Yeah I agree if you can somehow auction off your locked position it could be beneficial for both sides of the trade.

                                _mp_ Discussed with Drondin on discord, wouldn't work as proposed. See #governance-proposals channel for details.

                                  Zeus I will just add, that the structure you have applied to each term locked is really just a coarse form of Reward Scaling due to each term having a higher reward.
                                  I see problems:

                                  1. Someone who locks for 12 months must earn at a higher rate than someone who locks for 1 month 12 times - means that if someone chooses to continue their term there is little incentive as the reward doesn't automatically scale. Meaning someone is more likely to unstake at the end of each term, and sell some profit. Where with true reward scaling, there is an incentive to stay as the reward is continually increasing. And even when rewards are maxed out, they lose the multiplier, so it is an incentive to stay.
                                  2. Bonding - how can bonds remain attractive relative to APY? Currently the bonds are often more profitable. How often do you propose that the bond discount will be greater than the one month APY or other term's APY? There is little incentive to Bond if you have to keep the discount low so as not to disadvantage long term stakers? Where on the other hand if the Bond discount is greater, then there is no incentive to stake for a long time. Why would I lock for a period if say I could bond often enough to beat say a three month lock? To avoid this the bonding premium has to remain low more of the time, leading to slower treasury growth.

                                  True reward scaling doesn't have these problems.

                                    There should be incentives for longer holding, although I'm not sure if the proposed solution is best.

                                    Bonds with different duration are pretty standard so I don't get why people are against the idea.

                                    I think the community should vote to affirm whether we support a new long term incentive mechanism (I'd support it) and then we can argue details.

                                    @Zeus will there be a community vote on this? If yes please when it will happen?

                                    Thx