Voting power, token locking and bribe wars have been making headlines for some time.
With v2 bonds, Olympus has some strong tools to benefit from this space.
Assume a 1-year bond - how will that be priced in relation to unlocked staking? A whole lot higher since the depositors will demand a huge discount versus staking to justify the time risk. Rates for long-term bonds will shoot up - not linearly but likely exponentially - similar to the pricing of theta in options. Long-term bonds will be very expensive for the protocol - exactly the opposite of what is desired.
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/02/021302.asp
But we know that the longer a depositor has locked up his gOHM (payout amount) through bonding, the more likely it is that his personal incentives are aligned with the long term health of the protocol. Such a depositor will take greater care for proper governance of the protocol.
If we can reward such depositors with additional utility from their bonds, this utility value will increase the demand for long-term bonds and work to depress the bond discount.
For every v2 bond purchased, it is readable from the blockchain:
- depositor 0x address
- payout amount (gOHM)
- created (timestamp) = date/time of purchase
- matured (timestamp) = date/time of maturity
- redeemed (timestamp) = 0 until redeemed
Assuming that:
- the bond has not yet been redeemed (redeemed == 0), and
- current date/time < matured
one can subtract <matured> from <created> to determine the lockup period in seconds.
If a regular (unlocked) sOHM / OHM / gOHM gives a factor of 1x voting power, the locked up (bonded) gOHM could provide a multiplier effect on the voting power derived from the length of the lockup period. Olympus could then offer bonds of varying term lengths knowing that the longer the term - the more voting power is given. Assuming that governance power is (or will be made) relevant then this power has a value and will be reflected in the pricing of the bonds as well as the liquidity and fee generation (?) of future secondary markets. Where one protocol may prefer discrete multiplier effect (like CRV) based on specific bonds, another may prefer a linear multiplier, and a third may prefer an exponential multiplier.